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An extensive body of research has been dedicated to answering Myers (1984) question “How do ﬁrms
choose their capital structures?” Most studies have examined the capital structure issue in samples of ﬁrms
from a single country, typically the United States. Nevertheless, more recently, several studies have extended
their geographical scope and investigated the determinants of capital structure in international samples cov-
ering ﬁrms fromdifferent countries. Examples of such studies are Booth et al. (2001) for developing countries,
Bancel and Mittoo (2004) for European countries, Antoniou et al. (2008) for ﬁve developed countries,
Getzmann et al. (2014) for Asian countries, and De Jong et al. (2008), Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekinof Business & Economics, Building H3, Ofﬁce 1060, United Arab Emirates.
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world. A close look into these studies suggests twomajor remarks. The ﬁrst is that some ﬁrm-level factors are
associatedwith corporate leverage in a similarwaynomatterwhat country or region theﬁrm is located in. For
instance, consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure, ﬁrm size and asset tangibility are positively
associated with leverage ratios acrossmost, if not all, of these studies. Likewise, in line with the predictions of
the pecking order theory of capital structure, ﬁrm proﬁtability tends to be negatively associatedwith leverage
ratios in the majority of these studies. The second is that country-level factors play a signiﬁcant role in deter-
mining ﬁrm leverage. In particular, the nature and quality of a country's institutions impact ﬁrm optimal
(target) leverage. Furthermore, such institutions have been shown to affect the speed at which ﬁrms in a
speciﬁc country adjust towards their target leverage.
In this paper, we extend the aforementioned literature to the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA
hereafter) and try to answer two questions: (1) is ﬁrm leverage in MENA countries determined by the same
factors as those identiﬁed in other parts of the world? (2) Do institutional environments in MENA countries
affect ﬁrms' capital structures, and if so, how? To answer these questions we use a sample of ﬁrms from ten
MENA countries, which are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia,
and the UAE. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst comprehensive study of capital structure choices
in the MENA region. Not only there is no prior research on ﬁrm capital structure decisions dedicated speciﬁ-
cally to this region, but also studies using international samples tend to exclude countries from the region
from their coverage. For instance, De Jong et al. (2008), Fan et al. (2012), and Oztekin and Flannery (2012)
include ﬁrms from 37 countries to examine capital structure choices, but none of these countries is from
the MENA region. We ﬁll this gap in the literature and shed light on an important ﬁrm decision – ﬁnancing
decision – in a growing, but understudied, region.
Examining ﬁrm ﬁnancing choices in the MENA region is of utmost importance as the region's countries
have been going, for more than two decades now, through reforms aiming at moving away from centrally
planned economies to market-oriented ones. Firms are thereby supposed to behave consistent with the
goal of value maximization. It is thus of interest to investigate whether their ﬁnancing decisions are deter-
mined by the same factors observed in advanced countries where ﬁrms have been operating according to
the goal of valuemaximization for a long time, such as the U.S. andWestern European countries. Furthermore,
there is steady integration of the region's ﬁnancial markets in the global ﬁnancial system. For instance, inMay
2014, index compilerMSCI has upgraded stockmarkets of theUnited Arab Emirates andQatar from frontier to
emergingmarket status,which is expected to increase capitalﬂows into thesemarkets aswell as international
investors' focus on them. Such a move should, in turn, drive listed ﬁrms in those two markets to adopt best
practices in terms of investment and ﬁnancing decisions. It should also provide further incentives to other
stock markets in the region to adopt reforms and regulations that could promote their status from frontier
to emerging. Besides these positive developments, ﬁrms located in theMENA countries continue to face a rel-
atively weak institutional environment where investor protection is weak, bankruptcy regimes are deﬁcient,
and property rights are insecure. This is likely to affect their access to external capital, and, thereby, to
determine their optimal ﬁnancial structures as well as the speed at which they revert back to such optimal
structures following shocks.
To examine capital structure and its ﬁrm- and country-level determinants in the MENA region, we use a
sample of 444 listed ﬁrms from ten countries, over the 2003–2011 period, or 3717 ﬁrm-year observations.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the average ﬁrm in the MENA region has a book leverage ratio of 39% (median:
36.8%) and a market leverage ratio of 33.4% (27.5%), which is comparable to leverage ratios in other develop-
ing countries, reported in Booth et al. (2001) and Fan et al. (2012), but also to leverage ratios in the ﬁve most
developed countries in theworld, reported in Antoniou et al. (2008). Using a partial adjustmentmodel of ﬁrm
leverage that accounts for the dynamic nature of capital structure, we ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms inMENA coun-
tries have target capital structures towards which they adjust over time.We further ﬁnd that the speed of ad-
justment towards target leverage varies from one country to another, possibly reﬂecting differences in the
nature and quality of the institutional environments across countries, which, in turn, affect adjustment
costs. Our results also suggest that traditional ﬁrm-level determinants of leverage tend to affect debt ratios
in MENA countries in line with standard capital structure theories, and consistent with the ﬁndings of prior
research on countries from other parts of the world. For instance, we ﬁnd evidence of a consistent and strong
positive impact of ﬁrm size and asset tangibility on leverage and a negative impact of proﬁtability and growth
opportunities on leverage. Our cross-country analysis of the potential impact of the institutional framework
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tory effectiveness, and stronger rule of law usemore debt. In a further analysis, we also show that better qual-
ity institutions attenuate the impact of size and asset tangibility on leverage.
Our study contributes to two literatures. First, we extend research on cross-country differences in ﬁrm
capital structure by presenting new evidence from a different geographical region that the level of a country's
ﬁnancial development and the quality of its public governance impact ﬁrm ﬁnancing choices. We further
show that the quality of a country's institutions has not only a direct but also an indirect inﬂuence on ﬁrm cap-
ital structure. In this regard, our research intersects with evidence that capital structure depends upon a
country's legal system (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Fan et al., 2012), creditor rights' protection (De Jong et al.,
2008; Cho et al., 2014), corruption (Fan et al., 2012), and whether an economy is market- or bank-based
(Antoniou et al., 2008). Our paper presents further evidence on the beneﬁts of improving a country's institu-
tional quality.
Second, we contribute to the build-up of a literature that examines ﬁrm ﬁnancing choices in emerging
markets whose institutional frameworks are generally different from those underpinningWestern – especial-
ly U.S –models of capital structure. Speciﬁcally, our study adds to Ebrahim et al. (2014), who document evi-
dence of the inﬂuence of political patronage on Malaysian ﬁrms' capital structures, Deesomak et al. (2004),
who show that legal, ﬁnancial, and institutional environments inﬂuence capital structure decisions of ﬁrms
from the Asia Paciﬁc region, Chen (2004) whose ﬁndings suggest that the capital structure choices of Chinese
ﬁrms seem to follow a “new Pecking Order”, and Cespedes et al. (2010) who report that Latin American ﬁrms
exhibit higher leverage than expected because their ownership concentration is higher than those in devel-
oped countries. We extend this literature by shedding light on several issues related to capital structure in a
region characterized by a different institutional environment and that has received little, if any, attention in
the capital structure literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of capital structure
theories, describes the major characteristics of the institutional environment with a potential impact on
capital structure choices in the MENA region, and discusses predictions of ﬁrm- and country-level effects on
leverage. Section 3 describes our data set and empirical method. Section 4 presents empirical results. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Institutions and capital structure decisions in MENA
In this section,we ﬁrst, provide a brief review of the theories of capital structurewhichwe rely on to study
leverage decisions in the MENA region. We, then, provide a description of the quality of the institutional
environment in MENA countries. Finally, we use the insights of these theories and the characteristics of the
institutional settings to predict the effects of ﬁrm- and country-factors on leverage.
2.1. Capital structure theories
The major theories of capital structure are the static trade-off, pecking order, and market timing models
(Huang and Ritter, 2009). In contrast to the irrelevance theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the static
trade-off theory argues that ﬁrms have optimal debt ratios, which they need to hold tomaximize their values.
Speciﬁcally, in the presence of capital market frictions, ﬁrms have optimal debt ratios that result from a
trade-off between the beneﬁts and costs of debt. Such costs and beneﬁts have various sources, such as the
deadweight costs of bankruptcy, agency costs, and tax beneﬁts. In contrast to the trade-off theory, the pecking
order theory of capital structure suggests that a ﬁrm has no speciﬁc leverage ratio that maximizes its value. In
the pecking order framework, information asymmetry induces managers to believe that equity issues will be
underpriced by the market (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This, in turn, discourages them – i.e., managers – from
issuing new equity as long as they can ﬁnance their new investments with less adverse selection-prone secu-
rities, such as internal funds and debt. This preference order of ﬁnancing sources suggests that a ﬁrm's ob-
served leverage ratio reﬂects its past proﬁtability and investment opportunities. The market timing theory
also rejects the idea of target leverage. It rather argues that a ﬁrm's observed leverage reﬂects managers'
past attempts to time the equity market by issuing overvalued stock shares (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). In
the words of Baker and Wurgler, “…low leverage ﬁrms are those that raised funds when their market
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raised funds when their market valuations were low” (p. 2).
While the above-discussed theories have contributed signiﬁcantly to our understanding of someof the fac-
tors determining ﬁrm leverage, they also face signiﬁcant challenges as stand-alonemodels of capital structure
(Denis, 2012). To overcome part of these challenges, more recent literature has emphasized dynamic models
inwhichﬁrmshave target leverage ratios towardswhich they attempt to adjust tomaximize their values. This
adjustment can be slow or fast depending on the magnitude of transaction and security issuance costs – ad-
justment costs. This implies that in the presence of large adjustment costs, a ﬁrm's observed leverage can de-
viate signiﬁcantly from its target. Numerous empirical studies have accounted for the potentially dynamic
nature of capital structure, and attempted to test whether ﬁrms have leverage targets and if so, what is the
speed at which they adjust towards such targets (e.g., Fama and French, 2002; Flannery and Rangan, 2006;
Lemmon et al., 2008; Huang and Ritter, 2009).
2.2. MENA region institutional environment
In this section, we provide a description of the quality of the legal and contractual environment in MENA
countries, whichmay help in predicting and understanding capital structure decisions of ﬁrms located in this
region. In this discussion, we approach the region as a whole and emphasize institutions with implications to
ﬁrms' access to debt capital. We particularly focus on the quality of public governance, the state of insolvency
and information sharing regimes, and the ﬁnancial sector.
2.2.1. Public governance
The quality of public governance is one of the factors that determine economic agents' conﬁdence that their
claims and property rights, includingﬁnancial assets, arewell protected against expropriation by both the gov-
ernment and private parties. Inwell governed countries, the rule of lawprevails over any other rule – such as of
persons or political parties – and sovereign institutions are reliable and believed to strive towards effective pro-
tection of property rights and contract enforcement. Hence, lenders have better conﬁdence that their capital
will be recovered even in extreme cases of debtor default and may, thus, be more willing to extend credit at
more favorable terms. While MENA countries strive continuously to improve their public governance,
they remain, on average, among the countries where institutions suffer from many deﬁciencies. Reports
by international organizations regularly observe that, in many countries, the political system continues
to hold sway over the judicial system, the media, and the legislative system. Moreover, it is usually men-
tioned that in these countries, access to public services as well as to business opportunities is often de-
pendent on nepotism, tribal afﬁnity, patronage, or money. The result is rampant corruption, poor legal
enforcement of contracts, and widespread property rights' insecurity, which negatively impacts ﬁrms'
access to external ﬁnance in the region.1
2.3. Insolvency regimes, collateral, and credit information sharing systems
A country's insolvency regime – bankruptcy law –, typically, determines the extent to which creditors can
repossess collateral, reorganize the defaulting borrower, and recover a substantial part of the loaned capital in
case of default. This is not without implications for ﬁrms' access to external ﬁnance. For instance, Araujo et al.
(2012) ﬁnd that reforming bankruptcy law in Brazil, in away that enhanced creditors' rights in cases of debtor
default, resulted in increases of 10% and 23% in the amount ofﬁrm total debt and long-termdebt, respectively.
Djankov et al. (2007) report awide variation in creditor rights across countries, with implications for access to
credit by private businesses; countrieswhere creditors enjoy better legal protection have a greater ratio of pri-
vate sector credit to GDP.
InMENA countries, one of themajor issues thatﬁrms and investors face is the legal framework that deﬁnes
insolvency and collateral regimes and creditor rights. Bankruptcy systems inMENA countries remain weak in
settling insolvency cases through reorganization or liquidation. For instance, according to the Doing Business
report of the World Bank (2012), creditors in these countries can expect to recover, on average, only 32.71 See, for instance, the MENA Quarterly Economic Brief, issued in July 2014, for evidence on poor public governance in some MENA
countries.
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Sub-Saharan Africa.2 Likewise, insolvency resolution is highly costly in MENA countries as it amounts to
14% of the value of the debtor's estate, compared with 9% in OECD high-income countries. Moreover, the
MENA region average time to resolve insolvency is too long – about 3.5 years. Collateral legal regimes are
another concern for creditors in MENA countries. While statistics reported by the Enterprise Survey of the
World Bank show that access to credit is almost always contingent upon the availability of collateral, most
MENA countries suffer from the lack of reliable collateral regimes.3 As documented by Haselmann et al.
(2010), the quality of collateral law is an important determinant of bank lending. Yet, inmostMENAcountries,
the lawdoes not recognize non-possessory interests inmovable collateral and does not establish clear priority
rules between secured creditors after a debtor becomes in default. Consequently, MENA banks are said to
face problems related to secured lending, especially in terms of registration, enforcement, and liquidation –
particularly for movable collateral (e.g., Alvarez de la Campa, 2011).
Effective information sharing and credit reporting systems that provide lenders positive and negative
data on borrowers also support access to credit as they alleviate one of the major problems facing credit
institutions – information asymmetry (See for instance, Jappelli and Pagano (2002) for empirical evidence).
Information sharing systems in MENA credit markets are, bymany standards, under-developed. While credit
reporting systems all over the world rely more and more on private credit bureaus (PCB), thought to collect
and provide more comprehensive information about borrowers, those of MENA countries are still composed
mainly of public credit registries (PCR), characterized by a lower level of depth of credit information. Accord-
ing toMadeddu (2010), two-thirds of MENA countries still entirely rely on PCRs, which is a higher percentage
compared to all other geographical regions, except for Sub-Saharan Africa. While improving, the coverage
of the population of borrowers – individuals and ﬁrms – is also still low compared to other regions
(Business, 2013).2.4. Financial system
It is widely believed that ﬁnancial system development reduces the cost of external ﬁnance to ﬁrms
(e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998). MENA countries have engaged, over the last two decades, in a series of liber-
alization measures aimed at developing their ﬁnancial sectors (Ben Naceur et al., 2008; Ben Naceur and
Omran, 2011). Among the notable measures taken in this direction are the ending of government controls
on deposit and lending rates and on credit allocation, the removal of high reserve requirements, and the per-
mission granted to foreign investors to acquire shares through the stock market (liberalizing stock markets).
These measures are expected to enhance ﬁnancial development and, thereby to promote ﬁrms' access to ex-
ternal ﬁnance. Yet, most assessments agree that these endeavors are far from having achieved the desired
goals (e.g., Bourgain et al., 2012; Guyot et al., 2014). Ben Naceur and Omran (2011) note that “Despite
these reforms, security markets in theMENA region are still underdeveloped, with a limited number of listed
companies, low free-ﬂoat of shares, and thin trading” (p. 4). Only a handful of countries, such as theGCC coun-
tries, have relatively developed and efﬁcient bank sectors (Creane et al., 2004). Inmost of the other countries,
however, the banking sector continues to be characterized by a heavy involvement of government-owned
banks, known for lower efﬁciency in allocating credit and for deﬁcient risk management systems. Likewise,
in most of these countries, the banking sector is highly concentrated, and barriers to entry of new banks are
typically high (Turk-Ariss, 2009; Anzoategui et al., 2010).2.5. Predictions
2.5.1. Leverage and ﬁrm-level factors
To examine ﬁrm capital structure decisions in MENA countries, we use a set of common factors (Harris
and Raviv, 1991; Frank and Goyal, 2009) identiﬁed in most capital structure studies as having a signiﬁcant2 The recovery rate is 68.2% in OECD high-income countries.
3 The Enterprise Survey shows that 72.2% of loans granted inMENA countries require collateral, and that the value of collateral needed
represents an average of 176.7% of the amount of the requested loan (Based on datasets available on www.enterprisesurveys.org,
accessed on March 02, 2014).
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corporate leverage given the institutional and contracting environments that characterize MENA countries.
2.5.1.1. Firm size. Larger,more diversiﬁed,ﬁrms are expected to have higher target leverage ratios because they
have less volatile earnings and, subsequently, face lower expected bankruptcy costs (e.g., Rajan and Zingales,
1995; Fama and French, 2002). Moreover, larger ﬁrms may have better access to capital markets (Fama and
French, 2002), and thereby Face lower costs of raising additional debt, all else equal. Kurshev and
Strebulaev (unpublished manuscript) also argue that, in the presence of non-trivial ﬁxed costs of raising ex-
ternal funds, large ﬁrms have cheaper access to outside ﬁnancing. The trade-off theory, thus, predicts a posi-
tive effect of ﬁrm size on debt. Size may also be a proxy for information asymmetry between insiders and
outside investors. According to Fama and Jensen (1983), larger ﬁrms suffer from less information asymmetry
compared to smaller ones. As such, they are less prone to adverse selection problems, and are expected to
have easier access to external ﬁnance from both debt and equity capital markets. The pecking order theory,
thus, does not predict a clear-cut relation between size and leverage. As is standard in the literature, wemea-
sure ﬁrm size by the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE). In MENA countries where institutions with an
impact on ﬁrms' access to credit suffer from many deﬁciencies, we expect that access to debt capital will be
much easier for larger ﬁrms, for the latter have the connections and the reputational capital, necessary for ac-
cess to credit in a weak institutional and contracting environment. In a cross-country setting, we also expect
that the positive association between size and leverage attenuates in countries with relatively better quality
institutions.
2.5.1.2. Tangibility. The availability of tangible assets, such as property, plant, and equipment, can improve the
recovery rates for creditors in cases of borrower default. As a result, this lowers expected bankruptcy costs and
enhances lenders'willingness to supply credit. Additionally, tangible assets can reduce agency costs of debt by
preventing shareholders from substituting high-risk investments for low-risk ones (Frank and Goyal, 2009).
By reducing expected bankruptcy costs and agency costs, tangible assets are expected to raise a ﬁrm's target
leverage. In the pecking order model, tangible assets can be associated with low information asymmetry. This
implies that the cost of issuing equity is relatively lower for ﬁrms with more tangible assets, holding all else
equal. As a result, ﬁrms with more tangible assets are expected to have less leverage. Across MENA countries,
bankruptcy laws are weakly protective of lenders and property rights' security is low. It follows that creditors
fear expropriation and are more likely to require collateral to extend credit. Furthermore, poor collateral
regimes do not enable ﬁrms and lenders to rely on assets other than tangible ones –mostly real estate assets –
as loan collateral. We, thus, expect tangible assets to have a strong and consistent positive impact on ﬁrm le-
verage across MENA countries. We also expect this positive impact to shrink in countries with comparatively
better institutions – where collateral typically plays a less important role in lenders' willingness to extend
credit. We use the ratio of net ﬁxed assets to total assets as a proxy for tangibility (TANG).
2.5.1.3. Proﬁtability.More proﬁtable ﬁrms face less expected bankruptcy costs. Moreover, if not shielded with
important interest payments, these ﬁrmsmay end up paying higher amounts of corporate taxes (Modigiliani
and Miller, 1963). From an agency perspective, more proﬁts should also lead to the use of more debt as a
mechanism to curb managers' distorted incentives resulting from the availability of free cash ﬂow (Jensen,
1986). Therefore, in a trade-off framework, more proﬁtable ﬁrms are likely to increase their target leverage
ratios. The basic model of the pecking order theory suggests that ﬁrms have a preference for internal funds
over external ones to ﬁnance their investments. Thus, contrary to the trade-off theory, the pecking order the-
ory predicts that, holding investmentsﬁxed, leverage should be lower formore proﬁtableﬁrms. In anenviron-
mentwhere institutions are notwell developed to helpmitigate information asymmetry between lenders and
ﬁrms, such as in MENA countries, raising debt can be costly to ﬁrms. Thus, ﬁrms resort less to raising debt as
long as their proﬁtability allows them to meet their investment needs. We, thus, expect that more proﬁtable
ﬁrms have less leverage within each of our MENA countries.We use the ratio of operating income to assets as
our measure of proﬁtability (PROF).
2.5.1.4. Taxes.When interest is tax deductible, the greater the tax rates a ﬁrm faces and the more beneﬁts it
derives from using debt; greater interest payments result in more tax savings. The trade-off theory, thus, pre-
dicts that ﬁrms facing greater tax rates on proﬁts will use more leverage. We use the ratio of current income
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between TAX and ﬁrm leverage.
2.5.1.5. Bankruptcy risk. The trade-off theory implies that ﬁrms who are far away from ﬁnancial distress will
have higher leverage because they enjoy low expected costs of bankruptcy. To control for the potential impact
of ﬁnancial distress on corporate leverage, we include Altman's Z-score asmodiﬁed byMacKie-Mason (1990)
in the leverage regression equations. Altman's Z-score is a measure of the ex ante probability of distress
(Graham, 2000), with higher values indicating a lower probability of distress. According to the trade-off
model, we should observe a positive association between Z-score and leverage.
2.5.1.6. Liquidity. Firmswithmore liquid assets face lower bankruptcy costs, which enables them to raisemore
debt. More liquidity – free cash ﬂow – is also a source of agency costs; ﬁrms with more liquidity, therefore,
gain from usingmore debt to discipline their managers. Hence, according to the trade-off theory, more liquid
assets will result in more leverage. However, in the pecking order theory, more liquid assets imply less
information asymmetry and, hence, a better ability to raise equity. This implies that higher asset liquidity is
conducive to less leverage. We use the ratio of current assets to total assets as a proxy for liquidity (LIQ).
2.5.1.7. Growth opportunities. According to the agency model of capital structure, ﬁrms with more growth op-
portunities should have less leverage. First, holdingproﬁtabilityﬁxed, theseﬁrms suffer less from the free cash
ﬂow agency problem,which reduces the beneﬁt of using debt as amechanism to disciplinemanagers. Second,
in the presence of growth opportunities, ﬁrms have incentives to use less risky debt, especially long-term
debt, to lower the agency cost associated with an investment policy where some valuable investment oppor-
tunities are foregone (Myers, 1977; Barnea et al., 1981). Third, high growth ﬁrmswhich aremore prone to in-
formation asymmetry may suffer more from the asset substitution agency conﬂict where insiders substitute
high risk investments for low-risk ones. According to this view, high growth ﬁrms can reduce their agency
costs by having less debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The pecking order theory predicts that growth
ﬁrms, which typically suffer from more information asymmetry, will accumulate more debt, holding proﬁt-
ability ﬁxed. Based on prior literature (e.g., Adam and Goyal, 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009), we use the
market-to-book ratio to proxy for growth opportunities (GROWTH). In MENA countries where information
asymmetry and property rights' and creditors' protection are major concerns, the sign of the within country
cross-sectional effect of GROWTH on leverage will depend on which effect – agency effect or pecking order
effect – prevails over the other.
2.5.2. Leverage and MENA institutional factors
To capture the role of institutional quality in ﬁrm leverage decisions across the MENA region, we rely on
several indicators of the quality of public governance and ﬁnancial development. While a complex and mul-
tifaceted concept, good public governance is commonly captured by some of its critical dimensions, such as
the rule of law, public sector efﬁciency, control of corruption, and democracy. We use three indicators
which capture three different dimensions of the quality of public governance: rule of law, regulatory effective-
ness, and corruption.4
2.5.2.1. Rule of Law. The rule of law refers to the preeminence of law in governing behavior within a society,
including of government institutions and ofﬁcials. We measure the extent to which a MENA country abides
by the rule of law by the rule of law index developed by theWorld Bank (RL). This index reﬂects perceptions
of the extent towhich agents have conﬁdence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence. This index ranges from−2.5 (weak rule of law) to 2.5 (strong rule of law). In countries where
institutions and individuals abide by the rule of law, investors are lessworried to be expropriated bymanagers
and ﬁrms. This is likely to enhance their willingness to extend credit to ﬁrms at relatively better terms. We,
therefore, expect that corporate leverage increases in the rule of law.4 Ideally, one could have also used indicators thatmeasure the state of bankruptcy regimes, creditor rights, investor protection, contract
enforcement, etc. However, when they are available for our sample countries, these indicators do not exhibit sufﬁcient time-series and
cross-country variation to ensure sound empirical estimations.
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implement policies and regulations that enhance the business climate and encourage entrepreneurship, pro-
duction, and exchange of goods and services.We use theWorld Bank's regulatory quality index as a proxy for
a country's regulatory effectiveness. This index captures perceptions of the ability of the government to for-
mulate and implement sound regulations regarding the acquisition of property, licensing of new businesses,
hiring of workers, importing factors of production, exporting output or capital, contracting with suppliers for
needed inputs, payment of taxes, government licenses and fees, and so forth. The index ranges from−2.5
(weak effectiveness) to 2.5 (strong effectiveness). We label this measure RE and expect it to be positively
associated with ﬁrm leverage.
2.5.2.3. Corruption. Corruption can make it difﬁcult to conduct business effectively, and may discourage ﬁrms
from raising debt capital due to the costly bribes that they need to disburse to be granted loans. In such a case,
the more corruption a country has and the lower the corporate leverage will be. Yet, an alternative view sug-
gests that corruption could be an efﬁcient “lubricant” against stringent economic regulation and red-tape. This
could be especially true for access to credit in countries where the contractual environment is not business
friendly and where banks are reluctant to extend credit at easy terms, as is the case in most MENA countries.
By bribing bank ofﬁcers, ﬁrms can get around regulations and stringent bank requirements related to collat-
eral, default risk, etc. In such case, more corruption should lead to the use ofmore debt, ceteris paribus. We use
theWorld Bank index of corruption as a proxy for a country's control of corruption (CORR). The index ranges
from−2.5 (weak control of corruption) to 2.5 (strong control of corruption).Whethermore corruption leads
to more or less corporate leverage is an empirical issue which we leave to the empirical estimations to
uncover.
2.5.2.4. Financial development. Financial development facilitates ﬁrms' access to external ﬁnance, especially
through enhancing the quality of information. Rather than considering whether a country has a market- or
a bank-based ﬁnancial system, in this paper, we take the view that it is the level of development of the
whole ﬁnancial system represented by both equity markets and ﬁnancial intermediaries that matters to
ﬁrmsﬁnancingdecisions. Subsequently,wemeasureﬁnancial development (FD) by an indicator that captures
size, activity, and efﬁciency of both ﬁnancial intermediaries and markets. This indicator developed by
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) and Levine (2002) is a principal component of ﬁnance activity, size and
efﬁciency where ﬁnance activity is the logarithm of the total value traded ratio times the private credit
ratio, ﬁnancial size is the logarithm of the market capitalization ratio times the private credit ratio, and
ﬁnancial efﬁciency is the logarithm of the total value traded ratio divided by overhead costs. Greater values
of FD indicate a more developed ﬁnancial system. Whether greater ﬁnancial development leads to the use
of more debt or equity is therefore an empirical issue.
Following Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), our multivariate analysis also controls for two macro-
economic factors: the inﬂation rate (INF) and GDP annual growth rate (GDPG).
3. Data and empirical method
3.1. Data
Our ﬁrm-level data are collected from the Fitch-IBCA Worldscope database. Macroeconomic data – GDP
and inﬂation rate – are obtained from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, whereas country-level insti-
tutional variables are obtained from various sources, such as the Financial Structure Database and the Gover-
nance Indicators Database of the World Bank, and the Heritage Foundation. Variables used in the analysis,
their descriptions, and sources are reported in Table 1.
Our sample covers ﬁrms from 10 MENA countries. The countries are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the UAE.5 Thus, six of our sample countries are members5 The choice of these ten countries is dictated by the availability of data in theWorldscope database. In fact, inmany other countries of
the region, there are only a few or no reported companies in the database, which led to their exclusion from our sample.
Table 1
Description of the variables and sources.
Variable Description Source
Panel A: Variables used in the main analysis
Leverage measure
Book value total
debt ratio (BVD)
Total debt to total assets Fitch-IBCA Worldscope
Market value total
debt ratio (MVD)
Total debt to the market value of equity plus the book value of debt Fitch-IBCA Worldscope
Firm-level variables
Size (SIZE) Natural log of total assets Fitch-IBCA Worldscope
Tangibility (TANG) Net ﬁxed assets to total assets Fitch-IBCA Worldscope
Proﬁtability (PROF) Operating income to total assets Fitch-IBCA Worldscope
Tax shield (TAX) Current income taxes to Income before taxes Fitch-IBCA Worldscope
Distance from
bankruptcy (Z-
score)
Measured by Z-score = 3.3 (EBIT/total assets) + 1.0 (sales/total
assets) + 1.4 (retained earnings/total assets) + 1.2 (working capital/total
assets). Greater values indicate lower likelihood of bankruptcy.
Fitch-IBCA Worldscope,
authors' calculations
Liquidity (LIQ) Current assets to total assets Fitch-IBCA Worldscope
Growth
opportunity
(GROWTH)
The market value of equity plus the book value of debt to total assets Fitch-IBCA Worldscope
Economic variables
GDP growth
(GDPG)
Growth rate of real of GDP IMF's International
Financial Statistics
Inﬂation (INF) Rate of increase in CPI IMF's International
Financial Statistics
Institutional variables
Financial
development (FD)
Financial system development is a principal component of ﬁnance activity,
size and efﬁciency where ﬁnance activity is the logarithm of the total value
traded ratio times the private credit ratio, ﬁnancial size is the logarithm of
the market capitalization ratio times the private credit ratio, and ﬁnancial
efﬁciency is the logarithm of the total value traded ratio divided by
overhead costs. Suggested by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) and Levine
(2002).
Financial structure
database
(World Bank), authors'
calculations
Regulatory
effectiveness (RE)
Index reﬂects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound regulations regarding the acquisition of property,
licensing of new businesses, hiring of workers, importing factors of
production, exporting output or capital, contracting with suppliers for
needed inputs, payment of taxes, government licenses and fees, and so
forth. The index ranges from−2.5 (weak effectiveness) to 2.5 (strong
effectiveness).
Governance indicators
database
(World Bank)
Rule of Law (RL) Index reﬂects perceptions of the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence. The index ranges from−2.5 (weak law) to
2.5 (strong law).
Governance indicators
database
(World Bank)
Corruption (CORR) Index reﬂects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well
as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. The index ranges
from−2.5 (weak control of corruption) to 2.5 (strong control of
corruption).
Governance indicators
database
(World Bank)
Panel B: Alternative variables used in the robustness tests
Long-term debt ratio
(LTDR)
The ratio of long-term debt (maturing more than one year) to total debt.
Total debt is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities.
Fitch-IBCA Worldscope,
authors' calculations
Non-debt tax shields
(TAX1)
The ratio of depreciation and amortization to total asset Fitch-IBCA Worldscope,
authors' calculations
Notes: This table describes the variables used in the paper.
107M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129of the Gulf Cooperation Council characterized by oil-export-based economies. We use annual data over the
period 2003–2011. Following prior research, we exclude all ﬁnancial ﬁrms whose capital structure decisions
obey to other factors. We require that ﬁrms have at least three consecutive years of available data over the
sample period to be included in the sample. Moreover, we exclude ﬁrms with negative book equity. Our
108 M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129ﬁnal sample consists of 444 ﬁrms making up a total of 3717 ﬁrm-year observations.6 We winsorize all ﬁrm-
level variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the potential impact of outliers on the analysis.
3.2. Empirical method
In this study, we use twowidely usedmeasures of ﬁrm capital structure: the total book-debt ratio (BVD) –
a measure of book leverage – deﬁned as the ratio of total debt to book value of assets and the total market-
debt ratio (MVD) – a measure of market leverage –deﬁned as the ratio of total debt to ﬁrm market value,
where ﬁrm market value is measured as the sum of total debt plus the market value of equity.7 Following
prior work (Ozkan, 2001; Fama and French, 2002; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Flannery and Rangan, 2006;
Kayhan and Titman, 2007; Lockhart, 2010; Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin, 2011; Oztekin and Flannery,
2012; Flannery et al., 2013; among others), we use a dynamic partial adjustmentmodel. This model accounts
for the potentially dynamic nature of ﬁrm capital structure. The model, thereby, allows us to test whether
there is a target or optimal capital structure and if so, to uncover the speed at which ﬁrms move towards
their targets. Moreover, this model allows us to further control for the potential impact of unobserved ﬁrm-
speciﬁc, time-invariant, and institutional factors on each ﬁrm's target leverage. Speciﬁcally, an optimal capital
structure model can be formalized as:6 Sinc
in their
other on
7 ExaDij;t ¼ α0 þ β f Xij;t þ βcY j;t þ βfcXij;tY j;t þ δi þ εit ð1Þwhere Dij ,t⁎ is ﬁrm i's optimal or target debt ratio at time t in country j, Xij ,t and Yj ,t are, respectively, vectors
of ﬁrm-level and country characteristics (institutional, macroeconomic) that determine the target debt
ratio, Xij ,tYj ,t is the interaction between the ﬁrm-level and country-level determinants of capital structure,
δi is an unabsorbed ﬁrm ﬁxed effect. εit is a random error term assumed to be independently identical and
normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, εit~ iid N(0,σ2).
In the ideal world with perfect markets (i.e., in the absence of asymmetric information and transaction or
adjustment costs), ﬁrms fully and instantaneously adjust their capital structures to optimal leverage ratios in
response to any variations inﬁrm-level or country characteristicswithin eachperiod of time. This implies that,
at any point in time, a ﬁrm's actual leverage ratio should equal its optimum level, that isDi ,j ,t=Dij,t⁎ . However,
in the presence of capital market imperfections, ﬁrms' capital structures do not completely and instanta-
neously adjust towards optimal leverage ratios. This implies that following a shock to the capital structure,
a ﬁrm's actual leverage ratio will deviate from its optimal leverage, and then adjust partially towards the op-
timal ratio each period. Accordingly, the notion of partial adjustment can be formalized as follows:Dij;t  Dij;t1 ¼ γij;t Dij;t  Dij;t1
 
ð2ÞorDij;t ¼ 1 γij;t
 
Dij;t1 þ γij;t Dij;t ð3Þ
γij ,t is the adjustment parameter representing the adjustment speed of a ﬁrm's actual leverage ratiowhere
Dij ,t towards its optimal level, Dij , t⁎ . This coefﬁcient should strictly lie between 0 and 1, with higher values
indicating that the cost of deviating from the target is higher than the cost of adjustment and, hence, a high
speed of adjustment towards the optimal leverage ratio.e our data is collected fromWorldscope database, our sampleﬁrms aremainly listedﬁrms that tend to be among the largestﬁrms
respective counrties. We thus caution readers that our conclusions apply to large ﬁrms and may not necessarily be the same for
es such as small and mid-sized ﬁrms.
mples of studies that used these two measures of ﬁrm leverage include Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; Antoniou et al., 2008; etc.
109M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129Substituting Eq. (1) into the partial adjustment speciﬁcation in Eq. (3) and re-arranging removes the un-
observable optimal leverage Di,j ,t⁎ ,and yields the following empirical model:8 In t
lags of t
dustry a
9 See
yses of
10 Ind
end upDij;t ¼ ϑ0 þ θ0 Dij;t1 þΦx f Xij;t þΦycY j;t þΦxfcXij;tY j;t þ μ i þωit ð4Þwhere ϑ0=α0γij,t ,θ0=(1-γij,t) ,Φxf=βfγij,t ,Φyc=βcγij,t ,Φxfc=βfcγij ,t ,μ i=δiγij,t ,ωit=εitγij,t.
The dynamic panel model in Eq. (4) is estimated using the system GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which yields asymptotically efﬁcient and consistent estimators by con-
trolling for both unobserved individual heterogeneity (i.e., unobservable ﬁrm speciﬁc effects) and potential
endogeneity problems (i.e., the potential correlation between the regression errors and the explanatory
variables due to the existence of lagged dependent variables). This estimation combines the regression in
differenceswith the regression in levels. The instruments for the regression in differences are the lagged levels
of the corresponding variables. The instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the
corresponding variables.8
As well known, the consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the assumption that the lagged values
of the corresponding variables are valid instruments and that theﬁrst differenced regression residuals are free
from second order serial correlation. To check for the validity of the instruments, we use Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions. We use Arellano-Bond AR (2) test to examine for the presence of second order serial
correlation in the ﬁrst differenced regression residuals.
Our regression equations also include industry-dummy variables to control for the potential impact of in-
dustry afﬁliation on corporate leverage.9 We use Campbell's (1996) industry classiﬁcation to subdivide our
sample ﬁrms into eleven industries.10
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports summary statistics for our twomeasures of corporate leverage by country aswell as for the
full sample. In a nutshell, it suggests that there is a large cross-country variation in corporate leverage, with
the average BVD ranging from a minimum of 15.6% in Bahrain (median: 10.9%) to a maximum of 47.5% in
Oman (median: 46.3%). Using market values – MVD –, Bahrain continues to be the country where ﬁrms are
the least levered (Mean: 17.10%;median: 10.6%) andOman continues to be the countrywith themost levered
ﬁrms (Mean: 42.4%;median: 41.2%). Table 2 also suggests that there is a largewithin-country variation of cor-
porate leverage with standard deviations typically above 20%. The standard deviations of the book leverage
ratios show that they vary most across Omani ﬁrms (26.9%), while they vary least among Bahraini ﬁrms
(14.2%). The full sample statistics reveal that the average ﬁrm in the MENA region has a book leverage ratio
(BVD) of 39%, while the typical ﬁrm has a leverage ratio of 36.8% or less. Using the market leverage ratio
shows that debt represents 33.4% of the market value of the average ﬁrm in the MENA region (median:
27.5%). Table 3 presents mean values of our debt ratios over the sample period of 2003–2011. It shows that
while average debt ratios have increased over time in some countries (e.g., Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, and
Qatar) they have, however, decreased in some others (e.g., Egypt and Saudi Arabia).
Fig. 1 (Fig. 2) ranks MENA countries according to their mean values of BVD (MVD) from the lowest to the
greatest. It shows that MENA countries fall into two groups according to their corporate leverage ratios. A
group of relatively low corporate leverage represented by Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and to some
extent the UAE, and another group of relatively high corporate leverage made up of Kuwait, Tunisia,
Morocco, Egypt, and Oman. Fig. 2, based onmarket values, conﬁrms this observation, for almost all countries;his paper, we perform a two-step Blundell and Bond system GMM using STATA 10 procedure ‘xtdpdsys’with two- to ﬁve-period
he explanatory variables as instruments. In the Eq. (6), we also include dummy variables to control for unobserved country, in-
nd time-speciﬁc effects.
, for instance,MacKay and Phillips (2005) andMiao (2005) for evidence on the importance of including industry dummies in anal-
corporate leverage.
eed, Campbell (1996) identiﬁes twelve industries including ﬁnancial companies. Since we exclude the latter from our sample, we
with eleven different industries.
Table 2
Summary statistics of debt ratios.
Panel A: Summary statistics of debt ratios by country
No. of ﬁrms Observations Book value total debt ratio (BVD) Market value total debt ratio (MVD)
Mean Stdev Min 25th
Percentile
Median Max 75th
Percentile
Max Mean Stdev Min 25th
Percentile
Median Max 75th
Percentile
UAE 18 162 0.361 0.217 0.011 0.158 0.396 0.818 0.552 0.818 0.348 0.237 0.039 0.168 0.311 0.867 0.479
Bahrain 18 162 0.156 0.142 0.034 0.054 0.109 0.655 0.323 0.655 0.171 0.189 0.036 0.071 0.106 0.820 0.181
Egypt 93 837 0.472 0.255 0.090 0.287 0.472 0.921 0.612 0.921 0.408 0.256 0.028 0.189 0.368 0.855 0.583
Jordan 79 711 0.315 0.216 0.020 0.148 0.280 0.977 0.438 0.977 0.288 0.239 0.007 0.109 0.222 0.905 0.389
Kuwait 35 315 0.421 0.206 0.003 0.256 0.425 0.889 0.594 0.889 0.418 0.224 0.030 0.236 0.398 0.784 0.578
Morocco 37 333 0.435 0.215 0.004 0.293 0.436 0.894 0.596 0.894 0.367 0.257 0.003 0.153 0.342 0.621 0.563
Oman 62 558 0.475 0.269 0.033 0.260 0.463 0.947 0.675 0.947 0.424 0.258 0.013 0.202 0.412 0.897 0.685
Qatar 16 144 0.323 0.251 0.049 0.120 0.222 0.903 0.456 0.903 0.278 0.213 0.036 0.116 0.218 0.812 0.471
Saudi Arabia 55 495 0.318 0.201 0.002 0.154 0.265 0.847 0.471 0.847 0.202 0.191 0.002 0.063 0.127 0.791 0.290
Tunisia 31 279 0.434 0.214 0.001 0.122 0.452 0.825 0.575 0.825 0.274 0.273 0.006 0.041 0.318 0.906 0.479
Full sample 444 3717 0.390 0.244 0.001 0.197 0.368 0.977 0.566 0.977 0.334 0.247 0.002 0.126 0.275 0.906 0.505
110
M
.Belkhir
etal./Em
erging
M
arkets
Review
26
(2016)
99–129
Table 3
Mean values of debt ratios by country over the sample period (2003–2011).
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
UAE BVD 0.379 0.369 0.345 0.320 0.388 0.380 0.361 0.355 0.351
MVD 0.348 0.348 0.238 0.196 0.334 0.383 0.411 0.422 0.461
Bahrain BVD 0.121 0.111 0.156 0.133 0.140 0.186 0.185 0.187 0.182
MVD 0.164 0.174 0.169 0.110 0.142 0.175 0.170 0.211 0.220
Egypt BVD 0.535 0.492 0.539 0.498 0.468 0.463 0.454 0.391 0.403
MVD 0.550 0.475 0.528 0.353 0.355 0.313 0.376 0.369 0.349
Jordan BVD 0.318 0.307 0.308 0.308 0.317 0.340 0.335 0.338 0.318
MVD 0.240 0.248 0.250 0.247 0.265 0.285 0.298 0.325 0.335
Kuwait BVD 0.387 0.387 0.379 0.393 0.448 0.460 0.463 0.457 0.420
MVD 0.306 0.306 0.328 0.305 0.422 0.425 0.541 0.560 0.560
Morocco BVD 0.324 0.361 0.391 0.458 0.487 0.487 0.490 0.494 0.481
MVD 0.341 0.387 0.357 0.362 0.396 0.330 0.373 0.388 0.377
Oman BVD 0.484 0.484 0.464 0.454 0.464 0.479 0.455 0.464 0.484
MVD 0.487 0.457 0.447 0.427 0.432 0.438 0.409 0.404 0.400
Qatar BVD 0.217 0.237 0.287 0.332 0.385 0.360 0.393 0.368 0.358
MVD 0.187 0.197 0.235 0.174 0.338 0.305 0.344 0.368 0.378
Saudi Arabia BVD 0.368 0.362 0.350 0.314 0.326 0.305 0.327 0.300 0.320
MVD 0.305 0.242 0.246 0.070 0.182 0.172 0.229 0.214 0.204
Tunisia BVD 0.388 0.367 0.375 0.369 0.390 0.382 0.394 0.407 0.430
MVD 0.242 0.263 0.268 0.360 0.366 0.359 0.329 0.399 0.356
Notes: This table presents the mean book andmarket value of total debt ratio of our sample ﬁrms in 10 MENA countries for the period of
(2003–2011). Book value of total debt ratio (BVD) is measured by the ratio of total debt to total asset.Market value of total debt ratio
(MVD) is measured by the ratio of total debt to the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.
111M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129the only exception is Tunisia, whichmoves to the low-corporate leverage side. Overall, our descriptive statis-
tics show that leverage ratios in MENA countries are comparable to those observed in developing countries,
reported in Booth et al. (2001) and Fan et al. (2012), but also to those reported by Antoniou et al. (2008)
for the ﬁve most developed countries in the world – France, Germany, Japan, U.K., and U.S.
Table 4 reports mean values of the ﬁrm- and country-level variables used in the multivariate analysis of
corporate leverage in MENA countries by country, as well as the full sample mean and standard deviation
of each of these variables. We note that the UAE has the largest ﬁrms (SIZE: 5.651), followed closely by
Qatar (SIZE: 5.612), while Jordan (SIZE: 4.446) has the smallest ﬁrms. A remarkable difference in tax regimes
across MENA countries can be detected by looking at TAX. As regards the macroeconomic environment,
Table 4 shows that there is large cross-country variation in GDP growth, with Qatar scoring the highest aver-
age growth rate over the sample period (GDPG: 15.1%) and Bahrain having the lowest economic growth
(GDPG: 2.5%). The average annual inﬂation rate in MENA countries over the sample period was 4.7%, with
the lowest average inﬂation observed in Morocco (INF: 1.8%) and the greatest inﬂation rate observed in
Egypt (INF: 9.8%). The quality of institutions also varies from one MENA country to another. Financial devel-
opment varies widely across countries, with Oman having the least developed ﬁnancial system (FD: -0.754)
and Saudi Arabia having the most developed ﬁnancial system (FD: -0.109). In terms of regulatory effective-
ness, Governments of Bahrain (RE: 0.74), UAE (RE: 0.62), and Oman (RE: 061) are by far the most effective
in setting up and implementing regulations that have an impact on the quality of the business environment,
whereas the governments of Egypt and Morocco are the least effective ones in this matter. The rule of law
index indicates that Qatar has the strictest rule of law (RL: 0.692) whereas Morocco has the weakest rule of
law (RL: -0.138). Corruption is most rampant in Egypt (CORR: -0.57) and the least acute in the UAE (CORR:
1.03). Overall, even thoughMENA countries are often regarded as a uniform regional blockwith similar insti-
tutional characteristics, they, nevertheless, differ substantially in the quality of their institutions, which may
have an impact on the way their ﬁrms ﬁnance their assets.
In Table 5, we report Pearson correlation coefﬁcients between the different variables used in the analysis.
We ﬁnd that bothmeasures of leverage are positively and signiﬁcantly correlatedwith ﬁrm size and asset tan-
gibility. Consistent with the predictions of the pecking order theory, bothmeasures of leverage are negatively
correlated with proﬁtability. Furthermore, consistent with the predictions of the trade-off theory, BVD is pos-
itively correlated with TAX. In line with the pecking order theory, LIQ is negatively correlated with bothmea-
sures of leverage. As predicted by the trade-off theory of capital structure, themarket value of leverage (MVD)
Fig. 1.Mean and median book value of total debt ratios. Notes: This ﬁgure presents the mean and median book value of total debt ratio of our sample ﬁrms in 10 MENA countries for the period of
(2003–2011). Book value of total debt ratio is measured by the ratio of total debt to total asset.
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Fig. 2.Mean and median market value of total debt ratios. Notes: This ﬁgure presents the mean and median market value of total debt ratio of our sample ﬁrms in 10 MENA countries for the period of
(2003–2011). Market value of total debt ratio is measured by the ratio of total debt to the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.
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Table 4
Summary statistics of explanatory variables and alternative variables used in the robustness tests.
Panel A: Main explanatory variables Panel B:
robustness tests'
variables
SIZE TANG PROF TAX Z-score LIQ GROWTH GDPG INF FD RE RL CORR LTDR TAX1
UAE
Mean 5.630 0.278 0.076 0.000 0.991 0.022 1.075 0.049 0.084 −0.547 0.621 0.458 1.031 0.092 0.032
Stdev 0.784 0.224 0.079 0.000 0.601 0.020 0.819 0.039 0.091 0.166 0.123 0.092 0.072 0.114 0.099
Median 5.590 0.261 0.062 0.000 1.009 0.015 0.971 0.041 0.102 −0.507 0.647 0.471 1.039 0.055 0.004
Bahrain
Mean 4.893 0.253 0.103 0.000 1.548 0.042 1.177 0.002 0.023 −0.492 0.741 0.630 0.330 0.036 0.065
Stdev 0.466 0.231 0.074 0.000 0.697 0.045 2.277 0.026 0.010 0.055 0.041 0.163 0.117 0.047 0.174
Median 4.862 0.154 0.099 0.000 1.401 0.023 0.931 0.009 0.022 −0.503 0.737 0.580 0.248 0.027 0.001
Egypt
Mean 4.935 0.340 0.101 0.296 1.311 0.017 1.569 0.053 0.099 −0.485 −0.346 −0.054 −0.570 0.092 0.054
Stdev 0.735 0.232 0.113 5.066 1.111 0.033 7.591 0.014 0.042 0.094 0.156 0.106 0.095 0.134 0.146
Median 4.900 0.336 0.092 0.118 1.263 0.011 0.835 0.047 0.093 −0.535 −0.414 −0.051 −0.532 0.024 0.007
Jordan
Mean 4.407 0.382 0.034 0.089 0.892 0.024 3.590 0.063 0.049 −0.027 0.284 0.389 0.305 0.072 0.047
Stdev 0.611 0.246 0.113 1.237 1.045 0.049 35.151 0.024 0.043 0.170 0.063 0.085 0.128 0.108 0.107
Median 4.330 0.356 0.035 0.044 0.899 0.011 0.745 0.079 0.050 0.022 0.319 0.413 0.304 0.049 0.009
Kuwait
Mean 5.570 0.191 0.067 0.034 0.972 0.023 0.934 0.063 0.042 −0.287 0.321 0.580 0.601 0.110 0.034
Stdev 0.659 0.200 0.113 0.094 1.031 0.033 0.659 0.063 0.028 0.325 0.126 0.027 0.230 0.126 0.105
Median 5.653 0.107 0.077 0.002 0.853 0.013 0.892 0.051 0.040 −0.221 0.329 0.574 0.526 0.062 0.003
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Morocco
Mean 5.121 0.339 0.122 0.246 1.705 0.040 1.961 0.048 0.018 −0.537 −0.206 −0.139 −0.271 0.097 0.121
Stdev 0.685 0.223 0.121 3.931 0.933 0.115 4.594 0.016 0.010 0.124 0.100 0.114 0.102 0.135 0.202
Median 5.000 0.325 0.106 0.190 1.788 0.011 1.148 0.048 0.013 −0.504 −0.185 −0.188 −0.306 0.003 0.037
Oman
Mean 4.417 0.481 0.051 0.249 1.024 0.019 1.027 0.044 0.039 −0.754 0.611 0.560 0.367 0.144 0.066
Stdev 0.557 0.266 0.114 2.526 1.558 0.030 0.850 0.038 0.035 0.095 0.067 0.115 0.112 0.177 0.118
median 4.408 0.478 0.058 0.120 1.096 0.010 0.839 0.037 0.032 −0.730 0.611 0.559 0.375 0.081 0.017
Qatar
Mean 5.610 0.405 0.078 0.010 0.686 0.027 1.209 0.152 0.064 −0.560 0.394 0.693 0.987 0.148 0.083
Stdev 0.845 0.254 0.077 0.005 0.564 0.032 0.833 0.083 0.070 0.188 0.192 0.167 0.391 0.177 0.159
Median 5.643 0.359 0.067 0.009 0.629 0.016 1.138 0.143 0.078 −0.525 0.371 0.708 0.812 0.068 0.009
Saudi Arabia
Mean 5.526 0.449 0.084 0.127 1.001 0.021 1.966 0.040 0.035 −0.109 0.079 0.146 −0.112 0.076 0.069
Stdev 0.705 0.244 0.099 0.228 0.975 0.037 2.088 0.021 0.031 0.429 0.070 0.052 0.160 0.120 0.141
Median 5.537 0.469 0.072 0.074 0.982 0.013 1.380 0.040 0.032 −0.219 0.097 0.163 −0.148 0.046 0.016
Tunisia
Mean 4.736 0.304 0.075 0.034 1.431 0.017 1.354 0.048 0.036 −0.537 0.018 0.137 −0.011 0.107 0.061
Stdev 0.472 0.169 0.065 1.038 0.524 0.015 1.749 0.011 0.009 0.030 0.079 0.084 0.177 0.114 0.090
Median 4.646 0.305 0.069 0.029 1.462 0.012 0.846 0.055 0.036 −0.554 0.004 0.159 −0.088 0.069 0.027
Full sample
Mean 4.923 0.370 0.073 0.257 1.119 0.023 1.895 0.052 0.055 −0.371 0.156 0.269 0.075 0.097 0.059
Stdev 0.804 0.251 0.111 2.856 1.125 0.046 16.567 0.037 0.048 0.335 0.370 0.280 0.479 0.137 0.133
Median 4.847 0.349 0.066 0.125 1.126 0.012 0.913 0.047 0.045 −0.434 0.165 0.295 0.187 0.341 0.010
Notes: See Table 1 for detailed deﬁnition of each variable. The data set is a panel consists of 3717 ﬁrm-year observations representing 444 ﬁrms from 10 MENA countries over the period 2003–2011.
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Table 5
Pearson Correlation coefﬁcients.
BVD MVD SIZE TANG PROF TAX Z-score LIQ GROWTH GDPG INF FD RE RL CORR
BVD 1.000
MVD 0.793***
(0.000)
1.000
SIZE 0.124***
(0.000)
0.109***
(0.000)
1.000
TANG 0.386***
(0.000)
0.023
(0.276)
0.033**
(0.041)
1.000
PROF −0.293***
(0.000)
−0.371***
(0.000)
0.201***
(0.000)
−0.081***
(0.000)
1.000
TAX 0.099***
(0.000)
−0.259***
(0.007)
−0.020
(0.257)
0.009
(0.600)
0.067***
(0.000)
1.000
Z-score −0.322***
(0.000)
−0.293***
(0.000)
0.081***
(0.000)
−0.253***
(0.000)
0.754***
(0.000)
0.018
(0.326)
1.000
LIQ −0.297***
(0.000)
−0.234***
(0.000)
−0.117***
(0.000)
−0.221***
(0.000)
0.046***
(0.004)
0.045***
(0.009)
0.091***
(0.000)
1.000
GROWTH 0.006
0.698
−0.202***
(0.000)
−0.045***
(0.005)
0.018
(0.259)
−0.052***
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.908)
−0.077***
(0.000)
−0.014
(0.403)
1.000
RGDP −0.233**
(0.041)
−0.019
(0.354)
−0.018
(0.279)
−0.017
(0.284)
0.067***
(0.000)
−0.022
(0.217)
0.018
(0.281)
0.008
(0.628)
−0.010
(0.536)
1.000
INF 0.359***
(0.000)
0.002
(0.910)
0.055***
(0.001)
−0.051***
(0.001)
0.029*
(0.076)
0.005
(0.774)
0.039**
(0.019)
−0.056***
(0.001)
0.022
(0.185)
0.294***
(0.000)
1.000
FD −0.202***
(0.000)
−0.238***
(0.000)
0.037**
(0.021)
−0.010
(0.528)
0.025
(0.131)
−0.025
(0.147)
−0.026
(0.132)
0.028*
(0.088)
0.032**
(0.044)
0.230***
(0.000)
−0.067***
(0.000)
1.000
RE −0.274***
(0.000)
−0.261***
(0.004)
−0.081***
(0.000)
0.021
(0.199)
−0.122***
(0.000)
−0.068***
(0.000)
−0.092***
(0.000)
0.037**
(0.023)
−0.012
(0.478)
0.050***
(0.002)
−0.212***
(0.000)
−0.086***
(0.000)
1.000
RL −0.357***
(0.000)
−0.136*
(0.088)
−0.094*
(0.000)
−0.018
(0.258)
−0.154***
(0.000)
−0.077***
(0.000)
−0.126***
(0.000)
0.021
(0.205)
−0.008
(0.611)
0.098***
(0.000)
−0.194***
(0.000)
−0.058***
(0.000)
0.536***
(0.000)
1.000
CORR −0.383***
(0.000)
−0.023
(0.280)
0.013
(0.424)
−0.043***
(0.007)
−0.121***
(0.000)
−0.079***
(0.000)
−0.112***
(0.000)
0.036**
(0.026)
−0.011
(0.508)
0.174***
(0.000)
−0.243***
(0.000)
0.004
(0.802)
0.535***
(0.000)
0.662*
(0.000
1.000
Notes: This table presents correlation coefﬁcients between variables. The data set is a panel consists of 3717 ﬁrm-year observations representing 444 ﬁrms from 10 MENA countries over the period
2003–2011. See Table 1 for the deﬁnition of variables. Numbers in parentheses indicate p- values. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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117M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129is negatively correlated with ﬁrm growth opportunities (GROWTH). We also notice that most of the correla-
tion coefﬁcients between ﬁrm-level variables are reasonably low, implying that multicollinearity is not a
major concern for our analyses. We now turn to the multivariate analysis to check whether these univariate
correlations continue to hold.
4.2. Firm-level determinants of capital structure
Table 6 reports the results of country-by-country regressions of corporate leverage on ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors.
Results based on book leverage are reported in Panel A whereas those based onmarket leverage are reported
in Panel B. We ﬁrst notice that the one period lagged dependent variable – BVD or MVD – has a positive and
signiﬁcant effect on ﬁrm capital structure across all the MENA countries.11 The coefﬁcient estimates on the
lagged dependent variables vary between zero and one. Such a ﬁnding suggests that MENA ﬁrms have target
capital structures towards which they adjust over time. The speed of adjustment with which ﬁrms move to-
wards their targets, however, varies from one MENA country to another implying that adjustment costs are
not uniform across the region. The fastest adjustment towards target book leverage is achieved by Bahraini
ﬁrms, followed closely by Kuwaiti and UAE ﬁrms, whereas the slowest adjustment takes place in Jordan,
Oman, Morocco and Qatar. The coefﬁcient on lagged BVD in Bahrain implies that ﬁrms close almost 80%
(1–0.197) of the gap between observed and target leverage within one year. On the other extreme,
Jordanian ﬁrms close slightly above half (1–0.455) of the gap within one year.
Using market leverage, Omani ﬁrms have the slowest adjustment speed towards target leverage; the co-
efﬁcient estimate on lagged MVD equals 0.581, implying that ﬁrms close almost 42% of the gap within one
year. Panel B also shows that Moroccan ﬁrms have the fastest adjustment towards target market leverage
as they close 77.1% (1–0.229) of the gapwithin one year. Overall, our results suggest that capital structure de-
cisions ofﬁrms located inMENA countries are dynamic, and thatmanagers target speciﬁc leverage ratiosmea-
sured in both book and market values. They also suggest that transaction costs vary substantially from one
country to another, possibly because of differences in the quality of institutional environments. This, thereby,
results in different speeds of adjustment towards target capital structures across these countries. Our results
also suggest that speeds of adjustment in our sample countries are generally higher than those reported in the
literature – 25% in Antoniou et al. (2008), 28% in Ebrahim et al. (2014), 34% in Flannery and Rangan (2006),
and up to 41% in Oztekin and Flannery (2012). A reasonable explanation of this ﬁnding lies with the type of
ﬁrms included in our sample. These ﬁrms are the largest ones in their respective countries with good reputa-
tions in their national ﬁnancial markets, which facilitate their access to capital at relatively low transaction
costs. This is likely to lower their adjustment costs and speed up their adjustment towards their target
leverages.
In step with the literature on other parts of the world (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001;
Antoniou et al., 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Ebrahim et al., 2014), we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant associ-
ation between ﬁrm size and leverage in all countries and across the two measures of leverage, possibly
reﬂecting the argument that large, more diversiﬁed, ﬁrms face lower default risk. The strong positive impact
of size on leverage can, in fact, be reasonably attributed to the association of ﬁrm size with the (lower) prob-
ability of default given the existence of inefﬁcient bankruptcy regimes across MENA countries. The nature of
these regimes increases bankruptcy costs and makes access to debt capital by relatively small (riskier) ﬁrms
difﬁcult and particularly costly. The positive association between ﬁrm size and leverage across all our sample
countries also reinforces the belief that information asymmetry between ﬁrm insiders and capitalmarkets is a
major problem in theMENA region, including for relatively large ﬁrms. In theory, larger ﬁrms suffer from less
information asymmetries and should use less debt as they are more able to issuemore informationally sensi-
tive securities, such as stock. Yet, this does not square with our ﬁnding of a positive association between ﬁrm
size and leverage, and suggests that MENA countries' ﬁrms do not gain much in transparency as they grow
larger.
The estimated relation between asset tangibility (TANG) and corporate leverage is positive and signiﬁcant
in all countries and across the twomeasures of leverage. This is not a surprising result in a regionwhere bank-
ruptcy laws are not strongly protective of creditors and property rights' security is low. Credit may therefore11 The only exception is the MVD regression for Qatar where the coefﬁcient estimate on the dependent variable is positive but statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant.
Table 6
Firm-level determinants of leverage: a country-by-country analysis.
Explanatory variables Country
UAE Bahrain Egypt Jordan Kuwait Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia
Panel A: Book value of total debt ratio (BVD)
BVD (t-1) 0.197***
(0.006)
0.134**
(0.053)
0.220**
(0.017)
0.468***
(0.009)
0.192**
(0.025)
0.412***
(0.000)
0.455***
(0.000)
0.400***
(0.000)
0.271***
(0.009)
0.326***
(0.000)
SIZE 0.094***
(0.004)
0.246**
(0.013)
0.037**
(0.021)
0.163***
(0.005)
0.120**
(0.012)
0.376***
(0.000)
0.341***
(0.000)
0.180**
(0.020)
0.184***
(0.009)
0.268***
(0.000)
TANG 0.246***
(0.000)
0.049**
(0.048)
0.171**
(0.012)
0.056***
(0.004)
0.303**
(0.019)
0.317***
(0.000)
0.122**
(0.020)
0.115***
(0.004)
0.307**
(0.023)
0.302***
(0.005)
PROF −0.193***
(0.000)
−0.269
(0.253)
−0.280***
(0.000)
−0.302**
(0.171)
−0.105
(0.384)
0.0251
(0.097)
−0.173**
(0.047)
0.013
(0.922)
0.010
(0.947)
0.296
(0.085)
TAX - - 0.004***
(0.003)
0.002**
(0.037)
0.035
(0.305)
0.001**
(0.046)
0.015
(0.714)
0.574 (0.623) 0.009
(0. 731)
0.011**
(0.036)
Z-score −0.072**
(0.026)
−0.095**
(0.030)
−0.293***
(0.000)
−0.110***
(0.000)
−0.035**
(0.039)
−0.070***
(0.009)
−0.106***
(0.003)
−0.271**
(0.017)
−0.027**
(0.028)
−0.154***
(0.000)
LIQ −2.441***
(0.000)
−0.405
(0.402)
0.106
(0.793)
−0.509**
(0.017)
−2.12**
(0.012)
−0.092**
(0.030)
−0.677***
(0.001)
−1.210 (0.181) −0.446**
(0.048)
−0.496**
(0.045)
GROWTH 0.011**
(0.011)
−0.0022
(0.762)
−0.007**
(0.036)
0.0002
(0.491)
0.001
(0.192)
−0.001***
(0.000)
0.013
(0.210)
−0.076**
(0.029)
0.000
(0.953)
−0.005
(0.178)
Intercept −0.075
(0.729)
−0.921**
(0.050)
0.907***
(0.006)
−0.334**
(0.020)
−0.203**
(0.025)
−1.517***
(0.010)
0.585***
(0.006)
0.712**
(0.044)
−0.891**
(0.033)
−0.655***
(0.001)
Sargan test 11.867
(0.920)
6.006
(0.998)
20.721
(0.413)
23.888
(0.247)
20.849
(0.406)
19.716
(0.475)
17.685
(0.409)
12.027
(0.525)
14.804
(0.321)
5.714
(0.999)
AR (2) test 1.073
(0.283)
−0.383
(0.701)
−0.763
(0.445)
−1.216
(0.223)
−1.894*
(0.058)
−1.549
(0.121)
−0.825
(0.409)
−1.985*
(0.057)
−0.649
(0.516)
−0.804
(0.420)
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Panel B: Market value of total debt ratio (MVD)
MVD (t-1) 0.253***
(0.000)
0.352**
(0.036)
0.292***
(0.000)
0.475*
(0.095)
0.254***
(0.000)
0.229**
(0.017)
0.581***
(0.000)
0.344
(0.321)
0.284***
(0.001)
0.321***
(0.000)
SIZE 0.269***
(0.004)
0.475**
(0.020)
0.145**
(0.049)
0.378***
(0.002)
0.256***
(0.000)
0.144***
(0.000)
0.248**
(0.020)
0.238**
(0.033)
0.415***
(0.000)
0.797***
(0.005)
TANG 0.384***
(0.000)
0.360***
(0.000)
0.164**
(0.049)
0.265**
(0.013)
0.322***
(0.000)
0.368***
(0.000)
0.210**
(0.025)
0.195***
(0.004)
0.221***
(0.000)
0.173***
(0.007)
PROF −0.209
(0.476)
−0.270
(0.109)
−0.190
(0.364)
−0.151**
(0.029)
−0.102
(0.171)
−0.418***
(0.000)
−0.169**
(0.018)
−1.683
(0.137)
−0.241**
(0.028)
−0.076
(0.392)
TAX - - 0.0023***
(0.000)
0.044**
(0.037)
0.100**
(0.036)
0.084**
(0.021)
−0.118
(0.256)
0.470
(0.131)
0.003
(0.842)
0.053***
(0.000)
Z-score (t) −0.043
(0.419)
−0.098**
(0.013)
−0.063*
(0.067)
−0.044***
(0.007)
−0.041***
(0.000)
−0.039***
(0.000)
−0.040
(0.115)
0.051
(0.716)
−0.017***
(0.010)
−0.105**
(0.039)
LIQ −3.272***
(0.000)
−0.078
(0.195)
−4.412***
(0.002)
−0.650**
(0.011)
−1.741***
(0.010)
−1.214
(0.298)
−0.741
(0.215)
−1.600**
(0.044)
−0.285
(0.327)
−1.065*
(0.065)
GROWTH −0.099***
(0.000)
0.016
(0.461)
−0.004***
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.144)
−0.209***
(0.000)
−0.176***
(0.000)
−0.208***
(0.000)
−0.069**
(0.046)
−0.026***
(0.000)
−0.095***
(0.003)
Intercept −0.974*
(0.093)
−1.073**
(0.047)
−0.721***
(0.001)
−1.393***
(0.009)
−0.901***
(0.000)
−0.259**
(0.031)
0.489
(0.144)
−0.722
(0.278)
−2.152***
(0.000)
−3.208**
(0.036)
Sargan test 11.195
(0.670)
8.325
(0.871)
15.303
(0.285)
6.992
(0.221)
19.706
(0.139)
18.070
(0.582)
12.604
(0.126)
12. 893
(0.598)
18.959
(0.188)
8.422
(0.988)
AR (2) test −0.135
(0.892)
−0.091
(0.927)
−0.884
(0.376)
−1.004
(0.315)
−0.711
(0.476)
−0. 394
(0.693)
−0.059
(0.952)
−1.594
(0.110)
−1.422
(0.154)
−0.232
(0.816)
Notes: This table presents regression results of ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants of debt ratio by country. See Table 1 and for the deﬁnition of the variables. Panel A reports the results of the book total debt ratio.
Panel B reports the results of market total debt ratio. The data set is a panel consists of 3717 ﬁrm-year observations representing 444 ﬁrms from 10 MENA countries over the period 2003–2011. The re-
gressions are estimated using the two-step system GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) withWindmeijer (2005) small-sample correction method. The t-2 lags of
the variables used as instruments in the difference equation, and the same lags of differenced variables are used in the levels equation. Numbers in parentheses indicate p- values. All regressions include
dummies to control for time, industry and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. Sargan test is a test for the validity of instruments and is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of valid instruments. If p-value N0.05,
we conﬁrm the validity of instruments. AR (2) is a test for the second-order serial correlation and is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. If p-value N0.05, we conﬁrm
of no serial correlation at order two in the ﬁrst-differenced errors and the model is well speciﬁed. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
119
M
.Belkhir
etal./Em
erging
M
arkets
Review
26
(2016)
99–129
120 M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129be conditional upon the availability of collateral, especially tangible assets; ﬁrms with more tangible assets
can access debt ﬁnancing at relatively better terms. This ﬁnding is consistent with Flannery and Rangan
(2006) and Antoniou et al. (2008). As regards economic magnitude, Panel A shows that the coefﬁcient esti-
mate on TANG is largest in Morocco, suggesting that this country's ﬁrms depend the most on tangible assets
to raise debt. One can reasonably link this ﬁnding to the quality of governance and institutions in Morocco.
Among our sample countries, Morocco is only better than Egypt in terms of corruption and regulatory effec-
tiveness, and is the worst in terms of rule of law. Sufﬁcient tangible collateral may thus be the only guarantee
that creditors can have to grant loans. Bahrain on the other hand has theweakest economic effect of TANG on
ﬁrm leverage. It also has the highest score of regulatory effectiveness and the second best score in rule of law.
Hence, the effect of tangible assets on corporate leverage is very likely reﬂecting the quality of countries'
institutions.
The coefﬁcient estimate on PROF is negative and signiﬁcant in six out of the ten sample countries if we take
the book andmarket leverage regressions together. In line with the pecking order theory, ﬁrm leverage in the
UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia reﬂects historical proﬁtability. This result is consistent
with the ﬁndings of several studies using international samples (Booth et al., 2001; Antoniou et al., 2008; De
Jong et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2012, among others). The magnitude of the coefﬁcient estimate on PROF in the
book leverage (market leverage) regressions suggests that the strongest negative effect of proﬁtability on cor-
porate leverage is observed in Jordan (Morocco), possibly reﬂecting the severity of information asymmetries
in these two countries; this may drive managers to rely primarily on internally generated funds to ﬁnance
their investments.
In both Panels A and B, we estimate a positive and signiﬁcant relation between the corporate tax rate and
leverage in non-GCC countries, which are Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. Consistent with the trade-off
model, in each of these countries, more tax payments lead ﬁrms to borrow more, most likely to beneﬁt
from the interest-tax shield. Yet, the economic magnitude of this advantage is very small; in Tunisia, where
the coefﬁcient estimate on TAX is the greatest, a 10 percent increase in the tax rate results in only 0.11% in-
crease in corporate leverage. Apart from Kuwait in panel B, TAX has no impact on corporate leverage in any
of the GCC countries, reﬂecting the lenient corporate tax regimes of these oil-rich countries. In the UAE and
Bahrain, by law, corporations pay no taxes at all, while in Kuwait, listed companies are subject to a 2.5% in-
come tax. In Saudi Arabia, the corporate income tax rate of 20% is applicable only to non-Saudi shareholders,
while a religious tax (Zakat) at 2.5% is levied on Saudi and GCC nationals or companies owned by them. In
Qatar, the corporate tax rate is 10%, but is generally applicable to only foreign investors; wholly owned
Qatari/GCC entities are exempt from corporate taxation. Oman imposes corporate income at a rate of 12%, ir-
respective of the form of the company or the nationality. In both panels A and B, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with low
probabilities of ﬁnancial distress (high Z-score) use relatively less debt. This result is similar to Graham's
(2000) ﬁndings for U.S ﬁrms.
Panel A and Panel B together reveal that growth opportunities (GROWTH) are negatively and signiﬁcantly
related to leverage in all countries, except in Bahrain and Jordan. This is consistent with the agency view of
capital structure according to which high growth ﬁrms can reduce their agency costs by using less debt
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Antoniou et al. (2008) report similar results for their sample of ﬁve developed
countries. A cross-country comparison reveals that there is a remarkable difference in the economic magni-
tude of the impact of GROWTH on leverage. Speciﬁcally, Panel B suggests that raising debt by ﬁrms with
high growth opportunities is relativelymuch costlier in Kuwait and Oman. In sum, the country by country es-
timations reveal that the growth opportunities–corporate leverage relation in the MENA region is consistent
with other regions. It also suggests that the institutional environment may play a role in the extent to which
growth opportunities limit ﬁrms' use of debt, as themagnitude of this inverse relation varies across countries.
Taken together, panels A and B show that we estimate a negative and signiﬁcant relation between ﬁrm li-
quidity (LIQ) and leverage in nine out of the ten sample countries, with Bahrain being the only country where
LIQ is not signiﬁcantly associated with neither book nor market leverage. This inverse relation between a
ﬁrm's asset liquidity and leverage is consistent with Myers and Rajan (1998) andMorellec (2001) theoretical
view that lower asset liquidity increases managers' costs of expropriating value from creditors, and thus, re-
duces the cost of debt, thereby inducingﬁrms to increase their ﬁnancial leverage. This view is of particular rel-
evance in MENA countries where ﬁrms suffer from the lack of good corporate governance practices and the
risk of expropriation is typically high. Hence, creditors may be reluctant to extend credit to ﬁrmswith impor-
tant liquid assets that can be prone to easy expropriation. The alternative interpretation of this ﬁnding is that
121M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129because MENA collateral regimes are underdeveloped, and do not allow for the use of liquid assets, such as
receivables and marketable securities, as loan collateral, ﬁrms with more of these assets are less able to
raise debt, ceteris paribus.
4.3. Institutions and corporate leverage in the MENA region
To estimate the impact of institutional factors on ﬁnancial leverage, we pool all observations from the ten
MENAcountries and regress book leverage andmarket leverage on the set ofﬁrm- and country-level variables
described above. We include our four institutional factors in separate regressions to avoid problems of
multicollinearity. We ﬁrst report, in columns (1) and (7) of Table 7, the pooled regressions of book leverage
and market leverage on ﬁrm-level factors. Overall, the results suggest that, in the MENA region taken as a
whole, corporate leverage is positively related to ﬁrm size and tangibility and negatively related to proﬁtabil-
ity, default risk, tax payments, liquid assets and growth opportunities. Further, the coefﬁcient estimates on
most of the ﬁrm-level variables are economically meaningful. For instance, the coefﬁcient estimate on SIZE
in column (1) indicates that, on average, a one-unit increase in ﬁrm size results in a 5.5% increase in corporate
leverage in the MENA region. Likewise, based on column (1), the estimated coefﬁcient on TANG in column
(1) suggests that a one-unit increase in tangible assets leads to an increase in the leverage ratio of 16.1 per-
centage points whereas the coefﬁcient estimate on PROF implies that a one-unit increase in proﬁtability
leads to a decrease in the debt ratio by 20 percentage points. Moreover, a one-unit increase in the likelihood
of defaultmeasured by the Z-score lowers book leverage by 10.7%while a one-unit increase in LIQ reduces the
debt ratio by 47.5 percentage points, ceteris paribus.
In columns (2) and (8), we further control for GDP growth rate and inﬂation.We ﬁnd that ﬁrms located in
countries with greater economic growth and higher inﬂation rates operate with more ﬁnancial leverage. As
regards economic magnitude, the estimated coefﬁcients on GDP growth in columns (2) and (8) indicate
that a one-unit increase in GDP growth is associated with an increase in the book (market) leverage of nearly
39.4 (14.7) percentage points. Similarly, columns (2) and (8) indicate that a one-unit increase in inﬂation is
associated with an increase in the book (market) leverage of nearly 5.7 (28.5) percentage points, ceteris
paribus. We next estimate the impact of ﬁnancial development on leverage by including FD as an additional
explanatory variable. Both columns (3) and (9) suggest that ﬁrms located in countries with relatively more
developed ﬁnancial systems use more debt; the coefﬁcient estimate on FD is positive and signiﬁcant in
both book andmarket leverage regressions. The impact of FD is also economically signiﬁcant as a one-unit in-
crease in the FD index is associated with an increase in the book (market) leverage of nearly three (two) per-
centage points, ceteris paribus. This result suggests that debt capital supply is an important factor that
determines the degree of ﬁrm ﬁnancial leverage in the MENA region. Financial leverage is not a merely
ﬁrm-level decision, but also depends on the extent to which a country's ﬁnancial system is able to satisfy
ﬁrms' demand for debt capital. Our ﬁnding that ﬁnancial development is a signiﬁcant determinant of ﬁrm ﬁ-
nancial leverage over-and-above ﬁrm-level factors is all the more reasonable in the MENA region where ﬁ-
nancial systems tend to be weak; any improvement in a country's ﬁnancial system is expected to boost
ﬁrms' access to debt capital.
In columns (4) and (10), we estimate the impact of another measure of the institutional environment on
corporate leverage in theMENA region, namely regulatory effectiveness.We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient estimate
on RE loads positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that corporate leverage increaseswith the improvement in au-
thorities' regulatory effectiveness and quality. The estimated coefﬁcients on RE in columns (4) and (10) indi-
cate that a one-unit increase in RE is associated with an increase in the book (market) leverage of nearly ﬁve
(seven) percentage points. We next estimate the impact of the rule of law on corporate leverage. While the
coefﬁcient on RL in column (5) is positive but insigniﬁcant, it is, however, positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level in column (11) indicating that market leverage increases in the strength of the rule of law. In other
words, ﬁrms borrow more in countries where agents abide by the rule of law, property rights are better
protected and contracts enforced more effectively. Economically, the coefﬁcient estimate on RL in column
(11) indicates that a-one unit increase in RL raises market leverage by 8.7%. Corruption control also appears
to play a signiﬁcant role in determining corporate leverage in theMENA region; CORR appearswith a negative
and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate in both columns (6) and (12), implying that more severe corruption
(lower CORR) leads to greater borrowing by ﬁrms. This is consistent with the view that corruption can be
an effective means for ﬁrms to get around regulations and stringent bank requirements related to collateral
Table 7
Institutions and ﬁrm leverage in the MENA region.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Book value of total debt ratio (BVD) Panel B: Market value of total debt ratio (MVD)
Debt (t-1) 0.557***
(0.000)
0.571***
(0.000)
0.569***
(0.000)
0.571***
(0.000)
0.559***
(0.000)
0.572***
(0.000)
0.315***
(0.000)
0.326***
(0.000)
0.345***
(0.000)
0.330***
(0.000)
0.305***
(0.000)
0.289***
(0.000)
SIZE 0.055***
(0.000)
0.067***
(0.000)
0.068***
(0.000)
0.077***
(0.000)
0.068***
(0.000)
0.067***
(0.000)
0.051***
(0.000)
0.058***
(0.000)
0.058***
(0.000)
0.056***
(0.000)
0.065***
(0.002)
0.056***
(0.000)
TANG 0.161**
(0.035)
0.172*
(0.083)
0.173*
(0.077)
0.200**
(0.022)
0.165**
(0.047)
0.177**
(0.038)
0.109*
(0.081)
0.159*
(0.057)
0.160**
(0.050)
0.374**
(0.042)
0.441**
(0.045)
0.563**
(0.035)
PROF −0.200***
(0.000)
−0.200***
(0.000)
−0.196***
(0.000)
−0.196***
(0.000)
−0.202***
(0.000)
−0.200***
(0.000)
−0.269***
(0.000)
−0.213**
(0.014)
−0.204**
(0.020)
−0.224**
(0.014)
−0.229***
(0.007)
−0.247***
(0.004)
TAX 0.001
(0.462)
0.000
(0.584)
0.000
(0.596)
0.000
(0.586)
0.000
(0.601)
0.000
(0.584)
0.004***
(0.000)
0.004***
(0.000)
0.005***
(0.000)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.000)
0.004***
(0.001)
Z-score −0.107***
(0.000)
−0.108***
(0.000)
−0.108***
(0.000)
−0.107***
(0.000)
−0.109***
(0.000)
−0.108***
(0.000)
−0.089***
(0.000)
−0.081***
(0.000)
−0.080***
(0.000)
−0.083***
(0.000)
−0.082***
(0.000)
−0.085***
(0.000)
LIQ −0.475***
(0.000)
−0.460***
(0.000)
−0.459***
(0.000)
−0.470***
(0.000)
−0.458***
(0.000)
−0.460***
(0.000)
−0.854***
(0.000)
−0.901***
(0.000)
−0.903***
(0.000)
−0.912***
(0.000)
−0.896***
(0.001)
−0.892***
(0.002)
Growth 0.000
(0.214)
0.000
(0.231)
0.000
(0.255)
0.000
(0.237)
0.000
(0.221)
0.000
(0.231)
−0.001***
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.001)
−0.001***
(0.000)
RGDP 0.394***
(0.000)
0.360***
(0.000)
0.432***
(0.000)
0.402***
(0.000)
0.394***
(0.000)
0.147**
(0.020)
0.212*
(0.082)
0.191
(0.101)
0.134*
(0.091)
0.136
(0.228)
INF 0.057**
(0.027)
0.065*
(0.055)
0.072**
(0.023)
0.076**
(0.012)
0.057**
(0.018)
0.285***
(0.118)
0.272***
(0.001)
0.302***
(0.000)
0.335***
(0.000)
0.304***
(0.000)
FD
0.028**
(0.038)
0.017**
(0.035)
RE
0.055**
(0.037)
0.071**
(0.037)
RL
0.031
(0.169)
0.087***
(0.006)
CORR
−0.007*
(0.082)
−0.077***
(0.000)
Intercept 0.012
(0.838)
0.074
(0.274)
0.073
(0.282)
0.122*
(0.089)
0.083
(0.220)
0.074*
(0.274)
0.065
(0.288)
0.053
(0.388)
0.055
(0.375)
0.058
(0.348)
0.013
(0.827)
0.086
(0.156)
Sargan test 23.809
(0.168)
19.376
(0.115)
20.089
(0.128)
19.893*
(0.063)
17.588*
(0.091)
19.561
(0.120)
78.235
(0.137)
76.266
(0.151)
55.114
(0.233)
72.095
(0.185)
57.285
(0.214)
75.465
(0.149)
AR (2) test 0.575
(0.564)
0.4753
(0.634)
0.501
(0.615)
0.483
(0.628)
0.493
(0.621)
0.474
(0.635)
1.211
(0.270)
1.754*
(0.079)
1.455
(0.145)
1.638
(0.101)
1.650*
(0.098)
1.375
(0.169)
Notes: This table presents regression results ofﬁrm- country- and institutional speciﬁc determinants of debt ratio across countries. See Table 1 and for thedeﬁnitionof the variables. Thedata set is a panel consists of
3717ﬁrm-year observations representing444ﬁrms from10MENAcountries over theperiod2003–2011. The regressions are estimatedusing the two-step systemGMMestimator ofArellanoandBover (1995)and
Blundell and Bond (1998)withWindmeijer (2005) small-sample correctionmethod. The t-2 lags of the variables used as instruments in the difference equation, and the same lags of differenced variables are used
in the levels equation. All models are estimatedwith a switched on clustering option and thus, the computed standard errors are robust to interdependence in cross country error terms. Numbers in parentheses
indicate p- values. All regressions includedummies to control for time, country, industry andﬁrmﬁxed effects. Sargan test is a test for the validityof instruments and is asymptotically distributed asχ2under thenull
of valid instruments. If p-valueN0.05,we conﬁrm the validity of instruments. AR (2) is a test for the second-order serial correlation and is asymptotically distributed asN(0,1) under thenull of no serial correlation. If
p-value N0.05, we conﬁrm of no serial correlation at order two in the ﬁrst-differenced errors and the model is well speciﬁed. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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123M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129and default risk, such as those prevalent inmanyMENA countries. This result is also consistentwith Fan et al.’s
(2012) ﬁnding and view that “debt is expected to be used relatively more than equity when the public sector
is more corrupt, since it is easier to expropriate outside equity holders than debt holders”(p.27).
It is also worth noticing that including any of the institutional variables alters neither the statistical signif-
icance nor the economic magnitude of the ﬁrm-level variables' effects on leverage. This suggests that institu-
tional factors play a signiﬁcant impact on corporate leverage over-and-above the impact of ﬁrm-level factors,
and point to the importance of institutional quality in ﬁrms' ﬁnancing decisions in the MENA region. Overall,
further ﬁnancial sector development, better rule of law, and more regulatory effectiveness seem to enhance
ﬁrms' access to external ﬁnance, in particular debt capital.4.4. Additional tests: indirect impact of institutions
The results reported in Table 7 indicate that the quality of institutions has a direct impact on corporate
leverage; in general, institutions of better quality lead ﬁrms to use more debt. In this section, we argue that
institutional quality has not only a direct impact on leverage, but also an indirect one. The latter works
through the impact of institutional quality on the way some ﬁrm-level factors affect leverage. Speciﬁcally,
we conjecture that ﬁrm-size and collateral availability, which play a signiﬁcant role in MENA ﬁrms' leverage
decisions, become less important in relatively better institutional and contractual environments. In predicting
the impact of ﬁrm size on leverage in MENA countries, we argued that larger ﬁrms are expected to use more
debt as they may have more of the connections and the reputational capital necessary to circumvent a weak
institutional environment characterizing most MENA countries. However, as the quality of the institutional
environment improves, being a large ﬁrm may become less of an advantage to raise debt capital. In other
words, in the presence of well-functioning institutions that secure property rights and guarantee abidance
by the rule of law and awell-developed ﬁnancial system, creditorsmay become less reluctant to extend credit
to smaller ﬁrms, thereby increasing the latters' borrowing capacity. We, therefore, expect better quality insti-
tutions tomitigate the positive impact of size on corporate leverage. Likewise, we interpreted the strong pos-
itive association between asset tangibility and leverage, reported in Tables 6 and 7, as a natural outcome of the
underdeveloped regulatory and contractual environment that characterizes most MENA countries; in an un-
derdeveloped institutional framework, collateral is crucial to raising debt. Nevertheless, with improvements
in this framework, access to credit may become less contingent upon the availability of collateral. Hence, cor-
porate leveragemay become less dependent on asset tangibility.We expect better institutional quality tomit-
igate the positive impact of TANG on leverage.
To estimate the potential indirect impact of institutions on leverage, we re-estimate leverage models pre-
sented in Table 7 augmented with interaction variables between the institutional quality measures and SIZE
and between the institutional qualitymeasures and TANG. The results on the indirect impact of institutions on
book leverage through ﬁrm size are reported in Panel A of Table 8. Using market leverage yields qualitatively
similar results.12 In column (1), we estimate the impact of ﬁnancial development on the size-leverage relation
by including an interaction variable between FD and SIZE in the leverage regression equation.While SIZE and
FD continue to load positive and signiﬁcant, the coefﬁcient estimate on the interaction term is insigniﬁcant.
This ﬁnding suggests that ﬁnancial development has no impact on the way ﬁrm-size affects leverage; even
as the ﬁnancial system develops further, larger ﬁrms continue to operate with relatively more leverage, pos-
sibly due to their easier access to debt capital compared to smaller ﬁrms.
In column (2),we estimate the indirect impact of regulatory effectiveness on leverage by accounting for its
potential effect on the size-leverage relation. We ﬁnd that not only the coefﬁcient estimates on SIZE and RE
continue to load positive and signiﬁcant, but also the coefﬁcient estimate on the interaction term between
SIZE and RE loads negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that enhanced regulatory effectiveness attenuates the
impact of ﬁrm size on leverage. In column (3), we estimate the indirect impact of the rule of law on leverage
by considering its potential effect on the size-leverage relation. The results indicate that only SIZE and RL are
positively associated to leverage. The coefﬁcient estimate on the interaction term between SIZE and RL is,
however, insigniﬁcant, implying that the rule of law plays only a direct impact on leverage. In column12 These results are unreported for the sake of brevity, but are available from the authors upon request.
124 M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129(4), we estimate the indirect impact of corruption on leverage by accounting for its potential effect on the
size-leverage relation. Our ﬁndings indicate that corruption has neither a direct nor an indirect effect on
book leverage. SIZE, however, continues to be positively and signiﬁcantly associated with book leverage.Table 8
Indirect impact of institutions on book leverage (BVD).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Firm Size (SIZE) Panel B: Asset Tangibility (TANG)
Debt (t-1) 0.571***
(0.000)
0.563***
(0.000)
0.553***
(0.000)
0.574***
(0.000)
0.571***
(0.000)
0.552***
(0.000)
0.521***
(0.000)
0.546***
(0.000)
SIZE 0.067**
(0.000)
0.068***
(0.000)
0.053***
(0.000)
0.068***
(0.000)
0.067***
(0.000)
0.075***
(0.000)
0.066***
(0.000)
0.066**
(0.000)
TANG 0.172**
(0.045)
0.201**
(0.043)
0.179**
(0.032)
0.170**
(0.042)
0.123**
(0.038)
0.156**
(0.043)
0.104***
(0.001)
0.129**
(0.040)
PROF −0.196***
(0.000)
−0.194***
(0.000)
−0.200***
(0.000)
−0.200***
(0.000)
−0.195***
(0.001)
−0.201***
(0.000)
−0.205***
(0.000)
−0.201***
(0.000)
TAX 0.000
(0.591)
0.000
(0.550)
0.000
(0.794)
0.000
(0.587)
0.000
(0.598)
0.000
(0.526)
0.000
(0.563)
0.000
(0.533)
Z-score −0.108***
(0.000)
−0.107***
(0.000)
−0.108***
(0.000)
−0.108***
(0.000)
−0.160***
(0.000)
−0.108***
(0.000)
−0.128***
(0.000)
−0.108***
(0.000)
LIQ −0.460***
(0.000)
−0.469***
(0.000)
−0.456***
(0.000)
−0.461***
(0.000)
−0.443***
(0.000)
−0.452***
(0.000)
−0.449***
(0.000)
−0.453***
(0.000)
GROW 0.000
(0.252)
0.000
(0.220)
0.000
(0.210)
0.000
(0.228)
0.000
(0.259)
0.000
(0.189)
0.000
(0.188)
0.000
(0.218)
RGDP 0.363***
(0.000)
0.426***
(0.000)
0.408***
(0.002)
0.388***
(0.000)
0.362***
(0.000)
0428***
(0.000)
0.390***
(0.001)
0.381***
(0.000)
INF 0.066*
(0.091)
0.073**
(0.048)
0.042**
(0.028)
0.057**
(0.016)
0.065*
(0.082)
0.073*
(0.094)
0.088**
(0.029)
0.059**
(0.038)
FD
0.020**
(0.026)
0.015**
(0.031)
RE
0.306**
(0.029)
0.331**
(0.049)
RL
0.272**
(0.038)
0.164***
(0.000)
CORR
−0.043
(0.598)
−0.057***
(0.000)
FD × SIZE/TANG
−0.005
(0.604)
−0.019
(0.322)
RE× SIZE/TANG
−0.051**
(0.042)
−0.230***
(0.000)
RL × SIZE/TANG
−0.061
(0.020)
−0.355***
(0.000)
CORR × SIZE /TANG
−0.008
(0.588)
−0.149***
(0.001)
Intercept 0.073
(0.352)
0.072
(0.340)
0.055
(0.376)
0.082
(0.239)
0.069
(0.308)
0.115 (0.103) −0.091
(0.168)
0.066
(0.320)
Sargan test 19.99
(0.129)
19.335*
(0.061)
18.272*
(0.075)
19.198
(0.062)
19.578
(0.330)
19.207*
(0.072)
18.293*
(0.075)
21.175**
(0.042)
AR (2) test 0.505
(0.613)
0.4834
(0.628)
0.458
(0.646)
0.473
(0.636)
0.534
(0.593)
0.503
(0.614)
0.742
(0.457
0.4928
(0.622)
Notes: This table presents regression results of how the interactions between institutional environments and ﬁrm size effect of debt ratio
across countries. See Table 1 and for the deﬁnition of the variables. The data set is a panel consists of 3717 ﬁrm-year observations
representing 444 ﬁrms from 10 MENA countries over the period 2003–2011. The regressions are estimated using the two-step system
GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer (2005) small-sample correction method.
The t-2 lags of the variables used as instruments in thedifference equation, and the same lags of differenced variables are used in the levels
equation. Allmodels are estimatedwith a switched on clustering option and thus, the computed standard errors are robust to interdepen-
dence in cross country error terms. Numbers inNumbers in parentheses indicate p- values. All regressions include dummies to control for
time, country, industry and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. Sargan test is a test for the validity of instruments and is asymptotically distributed as χ2
under the null of valid instruments. If p-value N0.05, we conﬁrm the validity of instruments. AR (2) is a test for the second-order serial
correlation and is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. If p-value N0.05, we conﬁrm of no serial cor-
relation at order two in the ﬁrst-differenced errors and themodel iswell speciﬁed. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
125M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129In panel B of Table 8, we report the results of the estimations of the indirect impact of institutions on book
leverage through asset tangibility. Again, unreported market leverage results are qualitatively the same. In
column (5), we ﬁnd that FD and SIZE continue to be positively associated with leverage, whereas the interac-
tion term between FD and TANGhas no signiﬁcant impact on leverage. In column (6), we report a positive co-
efﬁcient estimate on RE as well as on TANG, and a negative coefﬁcient estimate on the interaction term
between RE and TANG. This ﬁnding suggests that more regulatory effectiveness mitigates ﬁrms' need for
more collateral to be able to operate with higher leverage ratios. In column (7), we ﬁnd that the rule of law
has both direct and indirect impacts on ﬁrm leverage; the coefﬁcient estimate on RL is positive and signiﬁcant
and the coefﬁcient estimate on the interaction termbetweenRL and TANG is negative and signiﬁcant. This im-
plies that a stronger rule of law lowers the impact of asset tangibility on leverage. In column (8), we ﬁnd that
the interaction term between CORR and TANG is negative and signiﬁcant, implying that as corruption dimin-
ishes – higher CORR –, the impact of asset tangibility on ﬁrm leverage decreases. Notice also that the magni-
tude and statistical signiﬁcance of the direct impact of CORR has also increased relative to the speciﬁcation
with no interaction term, reported in column (6) of Table 7. The overall message from column (8) is that
while better corruption control lowers leverage it also reduces the impact of asset tangibility on leverage.
To summarize, the evidence in Tables 7 and 8 indicates that institutions in theMENA region have two types
of impacts on corporate leverage: a direct impact and an indirect one. The direct impact suggests that better
quality institutions, namely a more developed ﬁnancial system, better regulatory effectiveness, and stronger
rule of law, lead to the use of more debt by ﬁrms. The indirect impact suggests that better institutions also at-
tenuate the impact of the way ﬁrm-level factors, namely size and assets tangibility, affect corporate leverage.
4.5. Robustness checks
In Table 9, we present additional tests intended to ensure the robustness of our results to alternative
measures of leverage, tax shields, and sample composition. In panel A, we use the long-term debt ratio
(LTDR) as our measure of leverage. A speciﬁc long-term debt ratio rather than a ratio of total debt may be
the target towards which ﬁrms attempt to adjust over time. Column (1)-(4) show that our conclusions on
the impact of our ﬁrm- and country-level variables on MENA ﬁrms' leverage continue to hold when we use
long-term debt rather than total debt as a measure of leverage. In panels B, C, and D of Table 9, we report re-
sults based on BVD as a measure of ﬁnancial leverage. Results – unreported for the sake of space – are quali-
tatively the samewhenwe useMVD. In panel B, we use non-debt tax shields (TAX1)measured by the ratio of
depreciation and amortization to total assets as an alternative to TAX. Using BVD as our dependent variable,
we ﬁnd that whereas TAX1 appears insigniﬁcant throughout columns (5) to (8), all other variables retain
their initial signs and signiﬁcance, indicating that using non-debt tax shields as an explanatory variable
does not affect the robustness of our ﬁndings.
In panel C of Table 9, we followGraham et al. (2014) and exclude regulated industries – utilities and trans-
portation companies – fromour sample. Results presented in columns (9) to (12) suggest that our conclusions
are not driven by the presence of regulated industries in our sample as we continue to report the same rela-
tions between our ﬁrm- and country-level variables and ﬁnancial leverage. In panel D,we exclude Egypt from
our sample to ensure that our results are not driven by the relatively heavy weight of Egyptian ﬁrms in our
sample (22.5% of total observations). Results reported in columns (13) to (16) indicate that our conclusions
are not driven by the presence of Egypt in the Sample.
5. Conclusion
An increasing number of studies have been highlighting the importance of a country's institutional and
contractual framework to ﬁrms' capital structure decisions. In this paper, we investigate the state of ﬁrm le-
verage in a region that has not been covered by prior research: the MENA region. We particularly focus on
two issues: (1) whether ﬁrm-level factors – size, proﬁtability, asset tangibility, growth, etc. – are associated
with leverage as predicted bymajor capital structure theories, and in similar ways to the ﬁndings of previous
researchwork on other countries and regions, and (2)whether countries' institutional frameworks play a role
in ﬁrms' capital structure decisions.
Our ﬁndings suggest that MENA ﬁrms operate with leverage ratios which are not much different from
those observed in countries from other parts of the world. Moreover, we document evidence that MENA
Table 9
Robustness tests.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Long-term debt ratio (LTDR) Panel B: Non-debt tax shields (TAX1)
Debt (t-1) 0.217***
(0.000)
0.228***
(0.000)
0.222***
(0.000)
0.218***
(0.000)
0.568***
(0.000)
0.554***
(0.000)
0.553***
(0.000)
0.549***
(0.000)
SIZE 0.109**
(0.003)
0.100**
(0.045)
0.106**
(0.047)
0.105**
(0.037)
0.063***
(0.001)
0.068***
(0.001)
0.061***
(0.002)
0.062***
(0.310)
TANG 0.565***
(0.000)
0.606***
(0.000)
0.684***
(0.000)
0.681***
(0.002)
0.150**
(0.031)
0.121**
(0.033)
0.126***
(0.035)
0.001***
(0.038)
PROF −0.706***
(0.000)
−0.702***
(0.000)
−0.700***
(0.000)
−0.706***
(0.000)
−0.245
(0.000)
−0.236
(0.000)
−0.237
(0.000)
−0.234
(0.000)
TAX 0.294***
(0.000)
0.296***
(0.000)
0.293***
(0.000)
0.293***
(0.000)
−0.009
(0.406)
−0.009
(0.437)
−0.008
(0.484)
−0.009
(0.481)
Z-Score 0.072***
(0.000)
0.085***
(0.000)
0.082***
(0.000)
0.085***
(0.000)
−0.149***
(0.000)
−0.146***
(0.000)
−0.147***
(0.000)
−0.146***
(0.000)
LIQ −0.303***
(0.000)
−0.261***
(0.000)
−0.267***
(0.000)
−0.254***
(0.008)
−0.453**
(0.012)
−0.484***
(0.009)
−0.497***
(0.008)
−0.488***
(0.009)
GROW −0.016***
(0.000)
−0.010***
(0.000)
−0.018***
(0.000)
−0.016***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.261)
0.000
(0.183)
0.000
(0.181)
0.000
(0.229)
RGDP 0.231*
(0.089)
0.245*
(0.087)
0.257*
(0.072)
0.297*
(0.082)
0.271***
(0.000)
0.263***
(0.001)
0.274***
(0.000)
0.272***
(0.000)
INF −0.203
(0.126)
−0.257
(0.163)
−0.298
(0.115)
−0.276
(0.121)
0.080**
(0.035)
0.079**
(0.035)
0.076**
(0.036)
0.082**
(0.033)
FD 0.062**
(0.004)
0.018**
(0.050)
RE 0.865***
(0.000)
0.036**
(0.043)
RL 0.647***
(0.000)
0.019***
(0.002)
CORR −0.254***
(0.001)
−0.052***
(0.000)
Intercept 0.213*
(0.059)
0.298*
(0.069)
0.250*
(0.095)
0.282*
(0.085)
0.129
(0.459)
0.155
(0.371)
0.138
(0.426)
0.136
(0.433)
Sargan test 34.168
0.528
31.258
(0.598)
37.346
(0.451)
36.990
(0.460)
20.096*
(0.530)
21.062**
(0.048)
20.672*
(0.055)
20.934*
(0.051)
AR (2) test 0.2458
(0.805)
0.161
(0.871)
0.191
(0.848)
0.170
(0.864)
0.452
(0.651)
0.412
(0.679)
0.416
(0.677)
0.404
(0.686)
Notes: This table presents additional regression results of ﬁrm- country- and institutional speciﬁc determinants of debt ratio across coun-
tries. See Table 1 and for the deﬁnition of the variables. In Panel A, models (1)-(4) replicate models (3)-(6) of Table 6 using Long-term
debt ratio (LTDR) as the dependent variable instead of Book value of total debt ratio (BVD). In thesemodels, the data set is a panel consists
of 3717 ﬁrm-year observations representing 444 ﬁrms from 10 MENA countries over the period 2003–2011. In Panel B, models (5)-
(8) replicate models (3)-(6) of Table 6 using Non-debt tax shields (TAX1) as explanatory variable instead of debt tax shields (TAX). In
these models, the data set is a panel consists of 3717 ﬁrm-year observations representing 444 ﬁrms from 10 MENA countries over the
period 2003–2011. In Panel C, models (9)-(12) replicate models (3)-(6) of Table 6 excluded Egypt from the sample. In these models,
the analysis ended with a sample contains 361 ﬁrms for a total of 3249 ﬁrm-year observations. In Panel D, models (13)-(16) replicate
models (3)-(6) of Table 6 excluded regulated industries (Transportation and Utilities industries) from the sample. In these models, the
analysis ended with a sample contains 406 ﬁrms for a total of 3654 ﬁrm-year observations. The regressions are estimated using the
two-step systemGMMestimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)withWindmeijer (2005) small-sample cor-
rectionmethod. The t-2 lags of the variables used as instruments in the difference equation, and the same lags of differenced variables are
used in the levels equation. All models are estimated with a switched on clustering option and thus, the computed standard errors are
robust to interdependence in cross country error terms. Numbers in Numbers in parentheses indicate p-values. All regressions include
dummies to control for time, country, industry and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. Sargan test is a test for the validity of instruments and is asymptot-
ically distributed as χ2 under the null of valid instruments. If p-value N0.05, we conﬁrm the validity of instruments. AR (2) is a test for the
second-order serial correlation and is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. If p-value N0.05, we con-
ﬁrm of no serial correlation at order two in the ﬁrst-differenced errors and themodel is well speciﬁed. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
126 M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129ﬁrms have target capital structures towards which they adjust partially over time. Yet, adjustment speeds
vary from one country to another, possibly reﬂecting differences in institutional environments across
MENA countries. We also ﬁnd that size, asset tangibility, proﬁtability, taxes, and growth are associated with
Table 9
Robustness tests.
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Panel C: Excluded regulated industries from the sample Panel D: Excluded Egypt from the sample
0.640***
(0.000)
0.621***
(0.000)
0.607***
(0.000)
0.623***
(0.000)
0.564***
(0.000)
0.561***
(0.000)
0.549***
(0.000)
0.561***
(0.000)
0.061***
(0.005)
0.109***
(0.006)
0.110***
(0.005)
0.107***
(0.006)
0.041***
(0.002)
0.048***
(0.007)
0.040***
(0.001)
0.049***
(0.002)
0.122**
(0.050)
0.119**
(0.054)
0.118**
(0.056)
0.118**
(0.055)
0.104*
(0.069)
0.104*
(0.064)
0.102**
(0.038)
0.103*
(0.051)
−0.207***
(0.002)
0.208***
(0.002)
0.217***
(0.002)
0.214***
(0.002)
−0.276***
(0.000)
−0.311***
(0.000)
−0.322***
(0.000)
−0.311***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.119)
0.000
(0.135)
0.000
(0.196)
0.000
(0.157)
0.000
(0.679)
0.000
(0.846)
0.000
(0.561)
0.000
(0.415)
−0.193***
(0.000)
−0.192***
(0.000)
−0.194***
(0.000)
−0.194***
(0.000)
−0.167***
(0.000)
−0.168***
(0.000)
−0.174***
(0.000)
−0.170***
(0.000)
−0.503***
(0.000)
−0.496***
(0.000)
−0.494***
(0.000)
−0.497***
(0.000)
−0.549***
(0.000)
−0.578***
(0.000)
−0.553***
(0.000)
−0.552***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.101)
0.000
(0.124)
0.000
(0.125)
0.000
(0.123)
0.000
(0.101)
0.000
(0.136)
0.000
(0.120)
0.000*
(0.091)
0.345***
(0.001)
0.343***
(0.002)
0.333***
(0.001)
0.332***
(0.001)
0.151**
(0.035)
0.163**
(0.021)
0.290**
(0.020)
0.166**
(0.021)
0.059*
(0.065)
0.049**
(0.059)
0.040**
(0.046)
0.060*
(0.550)
0.084**
(0.036)
0.074**
(0.043)
0.078**
(0.037)
0.074**
(0.042)
0.042***
(0.003)
(0.001)
0.067**
(0.036)
0.044**
(0.013)
0.038**
(0.044)
0.041***
(0.008)
−0.018*
(0.053)
−0.003
(0.697)
0.440*
(0.062)
0.403*
(0.086)
0.411*
(0.081)
0.399*
(0.090)
0.405*
(0.072)
0.365*
(0.072)
0.306*
(0.076)
0.413*
(0.074)
18.277
(0.508)
19.809
(0.439)
18.852
(0.459)
19.704
(0.543)
26.264
(0.134)
26.809
(0.145)
26.606
(0.129)
26.332
(0.134)
0.900
(0.368)
0.905
(0.365)
0.889
(0.373)
0.900
(0.368)
0.796
(0.522)
0.738
(0.482)
0.764
(0.493)
0.756
(0.468)
127M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129leverage consistent with the trade-off and pecking order theories of capital structure and the ﬁndings of prior
research on ﬁrms located in other countries and regions. When we use a cross-country setting to account for
the potential impact of institutional quality on ﬁrm leverage, we ﬁnd robust evidence that better institutional
128 M. Belkhir et al. / Emerging Markets Review 26 (2016) 99–129quality leads ﬁrms to use more debt. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms operating in countries with relatively more developed
ﬁnancial systems, stronger rule of law, andmore regulatory effectiveness operatewith greater ﬁnancial lever-
age. More corruption also leads to greater leverage, possibly because it helps in overcoming hurdles, to access
to loans, due to deﬁcient collateral and bankruptcy regimes that characterize most MENA countries.
Our ﬁndings add to the capital structure literature in two important ways. First, we enrich the growing
cross-country capital structure body of research by presenting evidence from a geographical region that has
not received attention in prior literature. This evidence suggests that a country's institutional quality matters
to corporate capital structure decisions. Second, we add to the literature that focuses on emergingmarkets by
highlighting the importance of improving developing countries' institutional environments for the sake of
better access to external ﬁnance by ﬁrms.
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